The Captures Clause
Ingrid Wuertht
The Captures Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the power
to "make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." A variety of courts,scholars;
politicians,and others have recently cited the Clause to support conflicting arguments
about the scope of Congress's power to initiate and prosecute war. Some claim or assume that the Captures Clause gives Congress power over the taking and detention of
people, while others conclude that the power is limited to property only. Similarly,those
who view Congress'spower broadly understandthe Captures Clauseas giving Congress
the general power to determine what (or whom) may be seized both as method of initiating conflict and as measure of war prosecution. Others maintain that the Clause
only gives Congress power over the adjudication and division of property seized by
armed private vessels. Many of these accounts rely on original history, yet none examines the Captures Clause in any detail.
This Article does so, tracingthe meaning of capturesthrough British and Colonial
Admiralty documents, prominent works of internationallaw, the Revolutionary War
and Articles of Confederation,and the drafting and ratificationof the Constitution.The
result is that the eventual language in the Constitution could have been plausibly understood in a variety of ways prior to the Revolutionary War, but it probably did not
include the power to determine what or whom could be taken. The Continental Congress used the word "captures" in a significantly different way-to authorize what
goods (but not what people) could be taken by both public and private vessels. This is
also the best readingof the Constitution'stext.
The Captures Clause illuminates a small but significantarea of constitutionalhistory, for captures were extremely important throughout the eighteenth century. It also
sheds important light on the meaning of the Letters of Marque and Reprisal, Declare
War,and Commander-in-ChiefClauses. Contrary to the views of almost everyone writing on these topics, the Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clause gave Congress only the
power to license private vessels to make captures-itwas the Captures Clause that gave
Congress the power to determine what property was subject to capture by both public
and privateforces. This, in turn, supports at least a relatively broad readingof the Declare War Clause,because it gives Congress a power closely tied to the initiation of war. It
also means that at least some questions of combat strategy were lodged with Congress,
narrowing the possible scope of the commander-in-chief power. Finally, however, a
careful look at the Captures Clause also illustrates gaps and overlaps in the Constitution's allocation of war powers.
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INTRODUCTION

The Captures Clause, which gives Congress the power to "make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water," seems to be experiencing a heyday. Although it is one of the most arcane passages in the Constitution, the Clause was cited by the Supreme Court in Hamdan v Rumsfeld and by lower courts in several recent opinions Dozens of law review articles and books have mentioned the Clause in the past few years,'

1 548 US 557, 591 (2006) ("The Constitution makes the President the 'Commander in
Chief' of the Armed Forces, Art. II, § 2, cl. 1, but vests in Congress the powers to 'declare War...
and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,' Art. I, § 8,cl. 11 .... ").
2
See Kiyemba v Obama, 561 F3d 509, 517 (DC Cir 2009) (Kavanaugh concurring); Bancoult v McNamara,445 F3d 427,433-34 (DC Cir 2006); United States v Moussaoui, 365 F3d 292,

320 (4th Cir 2004) (Williams concurring in part and dissenting in part); Al Odah v United States,
321 F3d 1134, 1136 (DC Cir 2003), revd, Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466 (2004); Hamdi v Rumsfeld,
316 F3d 450,462 (4th Cir 2003), vacd, 542 US 507 (2004); Harrisv Kellogg, Brown & Root Servic-

es, Inc, 618 F Supp 2d 400,422 (WD Pa 2009); O.K. v Bush, 377 F Supp 2d 102,117 (DDC 2005).
3 See, for example, David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 Harv L Rev 941, 1020 (2008); Anthony J. Bellia,

Jr, and Bradford Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 Colum L Rev 1, 32, 41-42
(2009); Robert Gray Bracknell, Real Facts,"Magic Language', the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and
ConstitutionalAuthority to Commit Forces to War, 13 New Eng J Intl & Comp L 167, 208, 215
(2007); Brian M. Christensen, Extending Hamdan v. Rumsfeld to Combatant Status Review Tri-

bunals, 2007 BYU L Rev 1365, 1395-97 (2007); Thcker Culbertson, The Constitution,the Camps
& the HumanitarianFifth Amendment, 62 U Miami L Rev 307, 348 (2008); Robert J. Delahunty
and John Yoo, Response: Making War, 93 Cornell L Rev 123, 125-26 (2007); Kathryn L. Einspanier, Burlamaqui, the Constitution, and the Imperfect War on Terror, 96 Georgetown L J 985,
998-99 (2008); Louis Fisher, Preserving ConstitutionalFreedoms in Times of National Crisis, 33

Vt L Rev 627, 639 (2009); Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 Yale L J Pocket Part 1, 6
(2009), online at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/764.pdf (visited Nov 4, 2009); Elizabeth Holtzman, Abuses of PresidentialPower:Impeachment as a Remedy, 62 U Miami L Rev 213,
219 (2008); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L Rev 1559, 1585 (2007); J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and HistoricalCase
against a Global Constitution, 95 Georgetown L J 463, 480 n 93 (2007); Jules Lobel, Conflicts
between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent Power over the Conduct of War, 69
Ohio St L J 391,395,402-03 (2008); David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S Cal L
Rev 477, 523 (2008); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Emancipation Proclamationand the Commander in Chief Power, 40 Ga L Rev 807, 827-28 (2006); Catherine Powell, Tinkering with Torture in the Aftermath of Hamdan: Testing the Relationship between Internationalism and Constitu-

tionalism, 40 NYU J Intl L & Polit 723, 776 (2008); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Separation and Overlap of War and Military Powers, 87 Tex L Rev 299, 319-21 (2008); Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution Means by "Declare War," 93 Cornell L
Rev 45,60 (2007); Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power,93 Georgetown L J 1213, 1240
(2005); Charles E. Schumer, Under Attack: Congressional Power in the Twenty-first Century, 1

Harv L & Policy Rev 3, 14 (2007); William Michael Treanor, The War Powers outside the Courts,
81 Ind L J 1333, 1336 (2006); Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress,the Commander-in-Chiefand Separa-

tion of Powers after Hamdan, 16 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs 933, 939, 963 (2007); John Yoo,
The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 147 (Chicago 2005).
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and it has featured prominently in two editorials in the New York
Times.'
But what does it mean? In short, no one really seems to know, although conjecture abounds. The Clause occupies interesting constitutional real estate, following, as it does, immediately after the powers to

"declare War" and "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal." Not surprisingly, interest in the Clause is generated in part by the longstanding debate over the scope of Congress and the president's respective
powers to initiate war.' But contemporary interest is also a function of
the Clause's potential significance in clarifying the respective powers
of the president and Congress to prosecute war, an important issue
particularly in the context of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
global fight against terrorism.6 In both debates, the Captures Clause
functions like a prop; it is pressed into the service of larger arguments,
with little or no analysis of the history or meaning of the Clause itself.
This neglect does a disservice to the arguments that the Clause is in-

voked to support, for it is impossible to determine which, if any, modem
arguments it bolsters without a better understanding of what the Clause

itself means. Nor is the neglect a product of a consensus about the meaning of the Captures Clause. Instead, its significance is fundamentally-if
superficially-contested along several dimensions. The reach of the
Clause, for example, is unclear, particularly whether it includes persons or
just property. The New York Times editorial page,7 US senators, and a

4
See Adam Cohen, Congress,the Constitutionand War: The Limits on PresidentialPower,
NY Times A18 (Jan 29,2007); Editorial, Terrorism and the Law: In Washington, a Need to Right
Wrongs, NY Times WK11 (July 15,2007).
5 See, for example, Jules Lobel, Covert War and CongressionalAuthority: Hidden War and
Forgotten Power, 134 U Pa L Rev 1035, 1039 (1986); Prakash, 93 Cornell L Rev at 62 (cited in
note 3); Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U Chi L Rev 1543, 1543 (2002); Yoo,
The Powers of War and Peace at 8 (cited in note 3).
6
See, for example, David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at
the Lowest Ebb-Framingthe Problem, Doctrine,and Original Understanding,121 Harv L Rev
689,736 (2008); Lobel, 69 Ohio St L J at 402-03 (cited in note 3); Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 31921 (cited in note 3).
7 An editorial in the New York Tumes on July 15, 2007 made the following claim:

Congress and President Bush are engaged in a profound debate over what the founding fathers intended when they divided the powers to declare and conduct war between two coequal branches of government. But on one thing, the Constitution is clear: Congress makes
the rules on prisoners. At least that is what it says in Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 11 of
the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to "make rules concerning captures on
land and water." And it is good that Congress seems finally ready to get back on the job.
Editorial, Terrorism and the Law, NY Times at WK11 (cited in note 4).
8 See Consideration of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 109th Cong, 2d Sess, in
152 Cong Rec S 10354, S 10385 (Sept 28, 2006) (Sen Byrd); Consideration of the Department of
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variety of scholars have assumed or argued in passing that the Clause
gives Congress power to control the detention and treatment of prisoners. The Supreme Court's citation to the Clause in Hamdan and other

cases may suggest that it agrees,'o but the Court has never directly considered this issue. Others assume or argue in passing that the Clause reaches property only." Little evidence is cited in either direction.2
The type of control that the Clause gives Congress over captures

is also unclear. "Rules concerning Captures" could mean rules for determining what (or whom) precisely is subject to capture by whom or
it might mean procedural rules governing the disposition and treatment of captures." Giving Congress the first kind of power-to deterDefense Appropriations Act, 2006, 109th Cong, 1st Sess, in 151 Cong Rec S 11061, S 11070 (Oct
5,2005) (Sen Feinstein).
9 See, for example, Barron and Lederman, 121 Harv L Rev at 736 n 143 (cited in note 6);
Bracknell, 13 New Eng J Intl & Comp L at 211 (cited in note 3); Douglas A. Hass, CraftingMilitary Commissions Post-Hamdan:The Military Commissions Act of 2006, 82 Ind L J 1101, 1103
(2007); Lobel, 69 Ohio St L J at 402 (cited in note 3); Justin W. Whitney, FISA's Future:AnAnalysis of Electronic Surveillance in Light of the Special Needs Exception to the Fourth Amendment,
47 Washburn L J 127, 142 (2007). See also Ramsey, 93 Georgetown L J at 1240 (cited in note 3)
(suggesting that the Captures Clause "may also be read to encompass the seizure of persons");
Geoffrey Corn, The Role of Courts in the War on Terror: The Intersection of Hyperbole,Military
Necessity, and JudicialReview, 43 New Eng L Rev 17, 32 (2008) (same); Ingrid Wuerth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation:The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106
Mich L Rev 61,84 (2007) (same).
10 See 548 US at 591 (listing the power to "make rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water" among the relevant Article I authorities). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 US 1, 10 (1942)
(citing the Captures Clause); Brown v United States, 12 US (8 Cranch) 110,126 (1814) (same).
11 Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 319 n 82 (cited in note 3); John Yoo, TransferringTerrorists, 79
Notre Dame L Rev 1183, 1201-02 (2004). See also Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith,
CongressionalAuthorizationand the War on Terrorism, 118 Harv L Rev 2047,2133 (2005) (defining the Captures Clause in terms of property); J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases-and
Their Relevance to Whether "Letters of Marqueand Reprisal"Constrain PresidentialWar Powers,
28 Harv J L & Pub Policy 465,468 (2005) (same).
12 The most extensive treatment of this question is found in two footnotes. Compare Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 319 n 83 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that captures does not include
people) with Barron and Lederman, 121 Harv L Rev at 736 n 143 (cited in note 6) (suggesting
that captures does include people).
13 See Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace at 147 (cited in note 3) (arguing that the Captures
Clause "involve[s] the power of Congress to recognize or declare the legal status and consequences of certain wartime actions, and not the power to authorize those actions."); Sidak, 28
Harv J L & Pub Policy at 468 (cited in note 11) (arguing that the Captures Clause refers to "legal
rules to determine when, for example, the ownership of property captured by a private party
during war lawfully transferred to the captor, thus extinguishing any subsequent claim of ownership by its owner at the time of capture"). Consider Paulsen, 40 Ga L Rev at 828 n 56 (cited in
note 3) (reasoning that it is "exceedingly unlikely" that the Captures Clause "would grant Congress power to forbid or restrict the President's conduct with respect to captures of enemy vessels, prisoners, or resources in the course of waging war authorized by Congress"). See also John
Norton Pomeroy, An Introduction to the Constitutional Law of the United States § 455-56
(Houghton Mifflin 1879).
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mine what (or whom) may be taken-could, if the power includes
control over the actions of the public armed forces," make inroads on
what is frequently believed to fall exclusively within the commanderin-chief power: tactical and combat decisions." More generally, the

Captures Clause is often cited for the broad proposition that Congress
has significant war-related powers. 16 Resolving both the reach and type
of control questions would help determine to what extent such citations are accurate.
There are other, related, uncertainties about the Clause, particu-

larly its relationship to the declare-war and marque-and-reprisal powers. If "Rules concerning Captures" includes the power to determine

what (or whom) may be taken, then Congress would have at least
some power to initiate hostilities" and to conduct low-intensity warfare. 8 This could suggest, in turn that the Declare War Clause included
war initiation, for it would be odd to give Congress the lesser, but not

the greater power. 9 Does this reasoning not, however, make the Cap-

14
Some conclude that the Captures Clause gives Congress the power over property taken
by private, but not public, vessels. See, for example, Sidak, 28 Harv J L & Pub Policy at 468 (cited
in note 11); Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 319 (cited in note 3).
15 See, for example, Hamdan, 548 US at 592 ("Congress cannot direct the conduct of campaigns...."); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility: ConstitutionalLessons of Vietnam and Its
Aftermath 25 (Princeton 1993); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution 51 (WW
Norton 2d ed 1996); H. Jefferson Powell, The President'sAuthority over ForeignAffairs:An Essay
in ConstitutionalInterpretation 115 n 123, 118 (Carolina Academic 2002); Ramsey, 93 Georgetown L J at 1236-42 (cited in note 3).
16
See, for example, Holtzman, 62 U Miami L Rev at 219 (cited in note 3); Gary Lawson, A
Truism with Attitude: The Tenth Amendment and Constitutional Context, 83 Notre Dame L Rev
469,487 (2008); Lobel, 69 Ohio St L J at 395, 420,453 (cited in note 3); Luban, 81 S Cal L Rev at
523 (cited in note 3); Powell, 40 NYU J Intl L & Polit at 776 (cited in note 3); Tung Yin, Structural
Objections to the Inherent Commander-in-ChiefPower Thesis, 16 Transnatl L & Contemp Probs
965,967 (2007).
17 See Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congressin History and Law 53,61-67 (SMU 2d ed 1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, The Presidency, War, and ForeignAffairs: Practiceunder the Framers,40 L & Contemp Probs 12,27 (Spring
1976); Charles A. Lofgren, War-making under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,81
Yale L J 672,697 (1972).
18 Compare Jules Lobel, "Little Wars" and the Constitution,50 U Miami L Rev 61, 67-69
(1995) (concluding that Congress has the power to control all low-intensity uses of force, by
virtue of the Marque and Reprisal Clause). But see Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1599 (cited in
note 5) (concluding that the Marque and Reprisal Clause gave Congress the power to control
only certain types of low-intensity warfare).
19 See, for example, J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-appreciated Power to Define and
Punish Offenses against the Law of Nations, 85 Tex L Rev 843, 917 (2007). See also Prakash, 93
Cornell L Rev at 62 (cited in note 3) (making the same point with respect to letters of marque
and reprisal).
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tures Clause redundant of the Declare War Clause? And why, then,
did James Madison remark that the Captures Clause was redundant of

a different power: to define and punish offences against the law of nations?" If the Captures Clause includes some power to conduct lowintensity warfare, is the Clause then duplicative of the Marque and Reprisal Clause? If-contrary to all of the foregoing-the Clause merely

provides rules for the adjudication and division of seized property, this
could support the argument that the declare-war and marque-andreprisal powers similarly have little to do with war initiation."
This Article undertakes to answer these questions by exploring
the history and original meaning of the Captures Clause. Although the
Article also describes the significance of the Clause in later debates,
the focus is on the original history, for several reasons. First, there are
few cases that explicitly consider the Captures Clause-most notable
are Brown v United States" and The Prize Cases"-and these do not

resolve the primary uncertainties surrounding the Clause.2 Second, as
described above, there is no generally accepted, well-settled contemporary understanding of what the Clause means. Third, debates about

related provisions of the Constitution, such as the Declare War and
Offenses Clauses, rely heavily on history." Finally, in addition to resolving modem doctrinal questions about the Clause, this Article

20
Delahunty and Yoo, 93 Cornell L Rev at 125-26 (cited in note 3). See also Joseph Story,
3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1175 (Little, Brown 1891) ("The power
to declare war would of itself carry the incidental power to grant letters of marque and reprisal,
and make rules concerning captures."); Prakash, 93 Cornell L Rev at 55 n 40 (cited in note 3)
(making the same point).
21 Letter from James Madison to Joseph Cabell (Sept 18, 1828), in Jonathan Elliot, ed, The
Debatesin the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the FederalConstitution600 (Lenox
Hill 1974).
22
See Yoo, The Powers of War and Peaceat 147 (cited in note 3); Sidak, 28 Harv J L & Pub
Policy at 468 (cited in note 11).
23 12 US (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
24
67 US 635 (1862).
25
See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw U L
Rev 923,963 (2009) (noting that the space for originalist methodology is larger when there is no
conflict with established precedent and stare decisis).
26
See, for example, Eugene Kontorovich, The "Define and Punish" Clause and the Limits
of UniversalJurisdiction, 103 Nw U L Rev 149, 149 (2009); Lobel, 69 Ohio St L J at 391 (cited in
note 3); Kent, 85 Tex L Rev at 843 (cited in note 19); Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace at 90-106
(cited in note 3); Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1543 (cited in note 5); Beth Stephens, Federalism
and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define and Punish... Offenses against the Law of
Nations," 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 447, 447 (2000); Jane E. Stromseth, UnderstandingConstitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 Yale L J 845, 865-86 (1996); Abraham D.
Sofaer, War, ForeignAffairs, and ConstitutionalPower: The Origins (Ballinger 1976); Lofgren, 81
Yale L J at 672 (cited in note 17). See generally Prakash, 93 Cornell L Rev 45 (cited in note 3).
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seeks to provide a history of the Clause itself, on its own terms. Captures were of great legal, political, and economic significance when the
Constitution was drafted; the history of the Captures Clause accordingly enriches our understanding of legislative power, and it also illustrates in dramatic fashion how the American colonists reworked familiar language and phrases, adapting them to the new government
they had formed.
The history of the Captures Clause is difficult to write, as Part I
describes, because "capture" and "captures" were commonly used in a
variety of contexts in the mid- to late eighteenth century, but the
Clause itself was the subject of almost no recorded discussion or debate. Not surprisingly, perhaps, today's uncertainties about the Clause
mirror uncertainties that arose throughout the nineteenth century.
Part II describes the word "captures" up to and including seventeenthcentury sources, many of which were still influential -either in their
original form or because their language was incorporated into later
documents-when the Constitution was drafted and ratified. Part III
looks at eighteenth century British admiralty documents, international
treatises, and other sources, including colonial American documents
prior to the Revolutionary War. These reveal a dramatic mid-century
increase in the use of the word "capture," primarily in the context of
property seized during maritime conflicts, but also occasionally to describe the taking of towns, armies, and individuals. This creates a spectrum of possible meanings for the Captures Clause.
Part IV analyzes the Articles of Confederation and documents
from the Revolutionary period. As a result of the novel way in which
federal power was allocated during the Revolutionary War, the colonists begin to use familiar language in new ways, including the word
"captures." The best reading of the Continental Congress's power over
"captures" was that it had a relatively narrow reach -not extending to
persons, and only to certain kinds of property-but that the type of
control it exercised was broad, including the power to determine what
captures could be made by both private and public vessels. For a variety of reasons discussed in Part V, this is also the best reading of the
text of the Constitution. In other words, none of the commentators,
modern or historical, have correctly described the original meaning of
the Captures Clause.
Part VI examines the significance of this new understanding of
the Captures Clause. Because the Captures Clause has been ignored
or misunderstood, commentators have also incorrectly described the
Marque and Reprisal, Declare War, and Commander-in-Chief Clauses.
This Part corrects those errors; indeed, it rewrites the meaning of the
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Marque and Reprisal Clause as it is understood today. This Part also

considers the relationship among these Clauses as well as those that
give Congress the power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations, and to make rules for the government and regulation of the

land and naval forces. Viewing these Clauses as a group, Part VI concludes that to a very remarkable extent, these powers granted to Con-

gress are closely related to international law and the potential for conflict with foreign nations-the text of the Constitution unmistakably
concentrates such powers not only in the federal government as a
whole, but specifically in Congress.
This conclusion is consistent with other very recent historical
scholarship that supports an expansive role for Congress in war initiation and prosecution. This new scholarship of congressional supremacy in war powers" has moved well beyond the old scholarship of con-

gressional supremacy, which focused mostly on Congress's power to
commit US forces to combat." New congressional supremacists generally argue that as originally understood the Constitution gave Congress broad exclusive power over the initiation and conduct of war.
Careful analysis of the Captures Clause is consistent with (and in

some respects affirmatively supports) this view, but it also offers reasons to be skeptical of scholarship that attempts to provide a comprehensive, seamless account of the Constitution's original meaning on
questions related to war.

I.

CAPTURES, CAPTURES EVERYWHERE

The word "capture" was used frequently in the late eighteenth

century, except in the places that would be most immediately helpful
to those seeking to understand the Constitution. In British practice
27 See Barron and Lederman, 121 Harv L Rev at 941 (cited in note 3); Lobel, 134 U Pa L
Rev at 1035 (cited in note 5); Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 299 (cited in note 3); Wuerth, 106 Mich L
Rev at 61 (cited in note 9). See also Kent, 85 Tex L Rev at 843 (cited in note 19); Luban, 81 S Cal
L Rev at 477 (cited in note 3).
28
See, for example, Louis Fisher, PresidentialWar Power 3-12 (Kansas 2d ed 2004); Lobel,
134 U Pa L Rev at 1035 (cited in note 5); Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 677-88 (cited in note 17); W.
Taylor Reveley, III, War Powers of the Presidentand Congress:Who Holds the Arrows and Olive
Branch? 55-115 (Virginia 1981). See also Stromseth, 106 Yale L J at 861-63 (cited in note 26)
(defending a strong view of congressional power to initiate war, at least as a matter of history).
As late as 2002, Professor Jefferson Powell suggested that there was no disagreement about the
president's exclusive tactical control over the armed forces. See Powell, The President'sAuthority
over Foreign Affairs at 114-15 n 123 (cited in note 15). See also Ely, War and Responsibility at 25
(cited in note 15) (defending a robust Congressional power to declare war, but noting nonetheless that the Commander-in-Chief Clause was designed "to keep Congress out of day-to-day
combat decisions once it had authorized the war in question").
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and international law it generally meant a seizure, usually by a maritime vessel, of moveable property either during war or in response to
harm caused by a foreign nation. The property itself was often referred to as "prize," or sometimes as "capture." The capture of enemy

vessels by ships sailing from America had been of substantial military
and economic importance during wars since the late 1730s, and the

cases that such captures generated became relatively commonplace in
many colonial vice-admiralty courts." Even in the opening days of the
Revolutionary War, Congress and the colonies passed legislation permitting the capture of certain British vessels and enabling courts to
hear captures cases. As in the 1740s, pamphlets and other documents
discussed the political, military, economic, and practical aspects of capturing enemy vessels at sea." Many of the documents most closely re-

lated to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution, however,
such as the notes of those attending the Constitutional Convention,
the Federalist Papers, and the records of the state ratifying conven-

tions barely mention captures. Even the standard works of international law most familiar in eighteenth-century America, such as those
by Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, tended to use the word
''capture" generally and relatively infrequently."
29
Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare,
1739-1748 6-28,37-48,113-51 (South Carolina 1991).
30 See, for example, An Essay of a frame of government for Pennsylvania,in James Humphreys, ed, Early American Imprints, Series 1: Evans, 1639-1800, No 14748 (Readex) (suggesting
that the appeal of captures cases is limited to a court appointed by the United States of America); Resolves of the General Assembly of the state of Massachusetts-Bay (Nov 1777), in Early
American Imprints, No 15417 (resolving to replace men's guns lost in capture); Notes of the
General Assembly of the Colony of Rhode Island (Feb 1776), in Early American Imprints,
No 15044 (granting women whose boat was captured by Captain Wallace the ability to recover
their personal property); James Chalmers, Plain truth, Addressed to the inhabitants of America,
containing,remarks on a late pamphlet, entitled Common Sense, 1776, in EarlyAmerican Imprints,
No 42999 (noting that during the war of 1756, Holland's ships were continually captured by the
British); William Henry Drayton, A charge, on the rise of the American empire, delivered by the
Hon. William-Henry Drayton, Esq; chief-justice of South-Carolina; to the Grand Jury for the
District of Charlestown, 1776, in Early American Imprints, No 14741 (describing American captures of British West-Indian ships); Samuel Baldwin, A sermon, preached at Plymouth, December
22, 1775, in Early American Imprints, No 14657 (praising the recent capture of British ships);
John Mein, Sagittarius'sletters and political speculations (Boston 1775), in Early American Imprints,No 14255 (arguing that the capture of Austrian and Swiss ships by Bostonians will not pay
a third of their debts); James Burgh, Political disquisitions; or,An enquiry into public errors,
defects, and abuses (Philadelphia 1775) in Early American Imprints, No 13851 (describing how, in
1768, the king had given up his share of the captures, 7,000 pounds, to lessen the debt); The Journal of the Proceedings of the Provincial Congress of North-Carolina,held at Halifax on the 4th
day of April, 1776, in Early American Imprints, No 14948 ("To reimburse the loss they have
sustained by the capture and detention of the sloop Joseph.").
31 See text accompanying notes 61-93.
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The key sources are, for the most part, less familiar ones, such as
British admiralty documents and the records of the Continental Congress. Indeed, the resolutions and ordinances of the Continental Congress are the most important material for understanding the Captures
Clause. Their titles and wording are closer to the text of the eventual
Constitution than the language used in other British, colonial, or international sources. Moreover, the text of the Articles of Confederation about captures-which was drafted and ratified as these resolutions and ordinances were written, debated, and enacted -is similar to
that used in the Constitution. Except for the organization and jurisdiction of the federal courts, there is little reason to think that the different wording about captures in the Constitution reflected any change
in meaning from the Articles of Confederation. The work of the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War with respect to captures was, in turn, directly influenced by British admiralty practice
and, to a lesser extent, by treatises on international law. Beginning
with these sources and moving forward chronologically -as this Article does-makes clear the context in which the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were drafted.
These sources show that the meaning of the word "capture"
changed over time, and that by the 1770s it had both a broad, general
meaning as well as a more narrow and specific one. For the most part,
however, these definitions were not mutually exclusive. Moreover,
there were other plausible definitions of capture that fell somewhere
in between. Adding to the complexity, and despite these variations in
prior usage, the Continental Congress used the word "captures" in yet
a different way. The variety of plausible definitions of the word, the
comparable lack of precision with respect to the word "rules," the
changes in usage over time, and the absence of contemporary debate
around this Clause of the Constitution all contribute to longstanding
confusion as to its meaning.
In the late nineteenth century, for example, John Norton Pomeroy defined the Captures Clause narrowly in one sense, to include only the "things taken" and not "the very act itself of taking,"3 meaning
that the Clause gave Congress the limited power to control "the disposition of all things taken."33 In terms of reach, however, he understood the Clause very broadly to include enemy property taken on land
or sea, enemy territory, and the "persons of the enemies taken prison-

32
33

Pomeroy,Introduction to the ConstitutionalLaw of the United States at § 455 (cited in note 13).
Id.
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ers." John Tucker's late nineteenth-century treatise on the Constitution is less clear, but suggests that the Clause had a narrow reach-to
include property, not people-but conferred broader control, to include the power to regulate the act of taking itself."
Similar questions also divided two famous jurists writing earlier
in the nineteenth century: Chief Justice John Marshall and Justice Joseph Story. In the Court's most important Captures Clause case,
Brown v United States, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the majority,
invalidated the seizure of enemy property by a US Attorney. Relying
in part on the Captures Clause, the Court concluded that the seizure
was unlawful because it lacked specific statutory authorization." Justice Story disagreed that specific statutory authorization was necessary; he viewed the Captures Clause as duplicative of the Declare War
Clause36 and understood the Declaration of War in 1812 as authorizing
such captures.37 Chief Justice Marshall also appears to have understood the Captures Clause as including people although this point was
dicta.38 The case does make clear that the Captures Clause gives Congress some control over the authorization to seize enemy property, but
its precedential value is limited because the seizure was made by a US
attorney (not the president, or someone acting under his direction)
and because the seizure was made during war, thus not directly implicating questions of presidential power or war initiation. Moreover, as
Justice Story pointed out in his dissent, the majority appeared to concede that had the property been outside the United States the seizure
would have been lawful, but the Captures Clause itself does not make
that distinction. 9
The Civil War generated debate as to whether the Captures
Clause gave Congress the power to confiscate rebel property and to
free slaves; some argued that the type of control conferred by the
Captures Clause was limited to determining procedural rules for the
' while others appeared to view the Clause
confiscation of property,4
more broadly.' In The Prize Cases, the Court upheld the president's

34 John Randolph Tucker, The Constitution of the United States: A Critical Discussion of its
Genesis, Development,and Interpretation578 (Callaghan 1899).
35 Brown, 12 US (8 Cranch) at 110.
36
Story, Commentariesat 62-64 (cited in note 20).
37 Brown, 12 US (8 Cranch) at 137, 149 (Story dissenting).
38 Id at 126-27.
39 Id at 137-39,151-52 (Story dissenting).
40 Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 2d Sess 1573 (Apr 8,1862) (Sen Hendersen).
41
See, for example, Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 2d Sess 2930 (June 25, 1862) (Sen Wade)
(defending broad Congressional powers to "appropriate" Confederate property to pay down war
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seizure of vessels that had violated a blockade of southern ports, even

though Congress had not declared war. Although this might suggest a
narrow reading of the Captures Clause (at least as an exclusive grant
of power to Congress), it is difficult to draw that conclusion because
Congress ratified the seizures, the Court relied heavily on international law, and the president was responding to an armed attack (rather

than initiating the conflict himself).
Contemporary uncertainty about the Captures Clause thus mirrors nineteenth-century uncertainty: whether its reach includes people,
whether the type of control includes the power to authorize captures,
its relationship to the Declare War and Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clauses-all were unclear then and still are today. The roots of
these uncertainties date back to the mid-seventeenth century.
II. THROUGH THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

Early British admiralty documents were in Latin, but by the end
of the fifteenth century some were drafted in English and these already used the terms "prize" or "prizes." A proclamation from the

king in 1490, for example, which prohibited the harboring of pirates,
complained that pirates were "suffered to utter and sell their prises,
spoiles, and pillages"; 2 an earlier proclamation from 1484 also uses the
term in several places, referring to "any prise or goodys takyn on the
see.4 3 Proclamations of neutrality," other proclamations and orders,

debt, as well as to enact rules for the treatment of belligerents, such as that they be "hung or shot
as a traitor" or granted "amnesty"). Nor were these issues resolved by Miller v United States, 78
US 268 (1870). Miller upheld the Confiscation Act, but did not distinguish between Congress's
declare-war power and the captures power, the executive branch did not challenge the Act, and
the Court took pains to explain how the seizure was consistent with international law, although it
left open whether such consistency was constitutionally required. Id at 304-10.
42 See Proclamationagainstharbouringpirates,or buying their goods, 1490, 6 Hen VII, in
R. G. Marsden, ed, 1 Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea, A.D. 1205-1648 145,

145-46 (Navy Records 1916).
43

Proclamationagainstpiracy.All ships to give security for good behaviour before sailing,

1484,2 Rich III, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 136, 136-38 (cited in note 42). See also The
Council,at the captor's instance,declare the meaning of the King's proclamationas to contraband,

1630, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 467,467 (cited in note 42) (using the word "prize").
44 See, for example, Proclamationof neutrality, 1536, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom
149, 150 (cited in note 42) (referring to predatory maritime practices "whereby both parties
suffer losse and detriment in their prizes").
45

See, for example, Grant by Elizabeth to Lord Clinton, Lord High Admiral, of one third of

his prizes 1560, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 169, 169 (cited in note 42) ("[W]e are pleased
that of all such prises as are or shall happen to be taken upon thennemyes of our sayd navye
.....
");
Instructions to Sir Richard Bingham to seize ships of the Low Countries to recompense the
Queen for moneys (£35,000) lent by her, 1583, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 231, 232-33
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legal opinions,0 orders in council, 7 and documents issued by the Lord
High Admiral4' all referred to "prize" throughout the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries.
The term "capture," by contrast was scarcely used during this pe-

riod. 9 Instead of using the verb "capture," these early British documents used "take"' ° and "surprise" 1 or phrases like "arrest, sease, and
(cited in note 42) ("[D]o your best endeavor to take one of them ...so as the prises to be taken
by you may [ ] countervaile the debt which her Highnes seketh to recover ....).
46 See, for example, Legal opinions as to whether, in time of war between the Emperor and
France, a ship of Ragusa, with Venetian goods on board, captured by Frenchmen, and retaken by
Dutchmen, was good prize to the Dutchmen, 1544, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 158,159 (cited
in note 42) ("The question is whether, this case thus standing, the shipp and goodds be to the
Dutche men a juste prize or noe."); Opinion of civilians as to the law in the case of a capturemade by
one belligerent of a ship of the other in a friend's harbour,1564, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom
179, 180 (cited in note 42) ("[W]hate so ever the enemye dothe take from thenemye in the harborowe of a frende, that is no prise."); Opinions of the doctors upon matters of prize law, 1568, in
Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 181, 181 (cited in note 42) ("[A] prise can not be good onles it be
taken on the sea within the jurisdiccon of one of the two princes in controversye.").
47 See, for example, Orderof Council as to enemy goods in friends' ships, andfriends' goods
in enemy ships, 1557, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 165, 166 (cited in note 42) ("[Y]f the
shippes of our subjects do take by sea any other shippes ... or men of our enemyes .. the whole
shalbe judged to be of good prise.").
48 See, for example, Warrantfor letter of reprisalagainstSpain and those of the Low Countries,
with authority to capture those supplying them with food or war material, 1585, in Marsden, ed, 1
Law and Custom 242, 243 (cited in note 42) (authorizing the "tak[ing] as lawfull prises all those
which relieve them with victuall, or ayde them with munition, under such articles which are sett
downe by the Lordes of her Majestie's most honorable privie counsell for breakinge bulke"); Howard to Sir John Gilbert and others, 1590, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 257 (cited in note 42)
(using prize frequently, not capture); A ship captured by a Frenchman at the entrance to Plymouth
Sound, with Genoese goods on boardfor London, restored with the consent of the FrenchAmbassador, 1569, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 182, 183 (cited in note 42) ("[Bjecause the sayde
shippe and goodes were taken within the Queene's Majestie's porte, whereby the same can be not
good prise.... the sayde shippe and goodes should be restored agayne to the owners thereof").
49
Modern English translations of original Latin documents do use the term "capture," but
it is difficult to assess how the terms would have been translated contemporaneously. See, for
example, Sentence of the Admiralty Court, condemning the St. Anthony and her cargo as good
prize, 1589, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 254,255 (cited innote 42).
50 See, for example, Warrant to the Warden of the Cinque Ports to issue letters of reprisal,
1563, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 174 (cited in note 42) (using "take" not "capture");
Commission of reprisals to George Reyman from the Queen, 1591, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and
Custom 270,271 (cited in note 42) (authorizing Reyman to "take by violence, or any other wayes,
all suche shippes and vessells as shall belonge unto the Kynge of Spayne, or to any his subjects");
Instructions to RichardJeoferyes, captain of the H.M.S. Thomas,from Sir Henry Stradlinge,1649,
in R. G. Marsden, ed, 2 Documents Relating to Law and Custom of the Sea, AD 1649-1767 1, 2
(Navy Records 1916) (using "take into your possession"); Sentence condemning as prize French
goods in a Hamburg ship, 1656, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 30, 31 (referring to goods
"taken and lawfully seized by some shippe or shippes in the immediate service of this Commonwealth..."); Order of the Council of State that suits touching captures made under foreign commissions be speedily heard, 1659, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 38, 38 (mentioning "shipps
lately surprised at sea"); Instructions to the Lords of the Admiralty to issue a commission to Sir
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apprehend"52 and "cause them to be broughte into some of our
portes."" For a noun referring to property, they use "prize," "goods,"
"shipps," and "merchandize."' 4 A prize sentence of admiralty judges
from 1652-the period of the Commonwealth, when the King was
killed and the office of Lord High Admiral was abolished -illustrates
the absence of the word "capture" by using instead the awkward
phrase "att the tyme of the said surprizall."" By the middle of the next
Thomas Grantham to assist the East India Company against the King of Bantam, 1683, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 105,107 (alluding to "all prizes that shall be taken by him").
51 See, for example, Proclamation as to captures made after the death of Elizabeth, 1603, in
Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 342,342 (cited in note 42) (referring to "the surprizing and taking
of the said King's subjects and goods ... as lawful prize."); Appointment of Sir Henry Middleton to
be general of three ships sent out by the East India Company, with power to use force in defence of
himself 1609, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 375, 376 (cited in note 42) ("[Y]ou doe not attempte or goe aboute to sett upon, take, or surprize their persons, shipps, vessells, goodes, or merchaundizes .... "); Ordersfor reprisalsagainstSpain, 1655, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 23, 24
(cited in note 50) (directing that Spanish property "may bee surprized and seized").
52 See, for example, Letters of Marque to William and George Winter authorising them to
seize, within the realm, Portugeseships and goods in recompense for their losses; with recognisance
of the Winters to surrenderthe letters when theirlosses were satisfied, 1569, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law
and Custom 184, 185 (cited in note 42) (authorizing the Winters to "arrest, sease, and apprehend,
all suche shipps, goods, wares, merchandizes, debts, and things whatsoever apperteyinge, belonginge, or due to oure sayde good brother"). This same pattern holds for colonial documents not
issued by admiralty. See, for example, A Proclamation,issued by William Penn, 1699, in Early
American Imprints, No 894 (cited in note 30) (offering a reward for apprehending pirates and
using the phrase "pursue, apprehend and secure").
53 See, for example, Commission from the Queen to the Lord High Admiral to issue commissions to capture pirates;and commission in pursuance thereof to William Holstocke, 1572, in
Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 191,195 (cited in note 42).
54 See, for example, Letters of marque authorising George Barnstra,having also a commission from the King of France, to capture Leaguer prizes and to bring them to England, 1591, in
Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 273, 274-75 (cited in note 42) (allowing Barnstra "to take and
apprehend, by waye of hostility, them, their shipps, merchandizes, and goodes ... [provided that]
they bringe all suche prizes as they shall so take"); Letters of reprisal to John Kitchin against
Spain, 1585, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 237, 238-41 (cited in note 42) (using language
such as: "myghte be licensed to staye, apprehende, and take, the goods of subjectes of the King of
Spayne"; "susteayned by reason of theire shipps and goods so taken"; "graunte commissions for
apprehending and taking"; "to have and enjoye the same as lawfull prizes"; "or as juste prizes in
the tyme of warre"); Commission to the Earl of Cumberland to capture Spaniards,with authority
to divide the spoil, 1592, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 278,279 (cited in note 42) (referring
to "such distributions of shares of goods and prises"); Articles sett downe by the Lords and others
of His Majesty's most honorableprivy council, 1625, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 410,411
(cited in note 42) (using "prize," not "capture," in instructions to privateers); Raynsford to the
Lords of the Admiralty, as to a valuableprize taken by a non-commissioned captor,1695, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 169,170 (cited in note 50) (same).
55 Sentence condemning French goods, 1651, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 12, 12-13
(cited in note 50). See also Sentence of the Vice Admiralty Court of Jamaicacondemning a prize
captured under the above, 1663, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 45, 45 (cited in note 50)
("[T]hey belonged to such Spanish subjects at the time of the seisure and surprizall, and ... were
lawfully surprized by force.").
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century, this usage had become common-but with the word "capture" instead of "surprizall."
By the mid-seventeenth century, the word "capture" appears in
instructions (apparently directed to privateers) for reprisals against
Holland. The instructions used "capture," like the word "surprizall"
above, to refer to the act of seizing a vessel, as in "on board at the
tyme of the capture."'' Subsequent instructions used the term in the
same way," as did an order of the Scottish Admiralty Court" and a
letter of marque from 1694." A warrant from the Lords of Admiralty

to the Vice Admiralty Court of Jamaica in 1694 to hear prize cases also
used the word "capture" as a noun, but to refer to property taken from

the enemy.'0 In all of these, "capture" was used to describe an event or
property that would later be the subject of a prize proceeding.

The most significant international law treatise of the seventeenth
century, Hugo Grotius's The Rights of War and Peace" from 1625, uses
the words "capture" and "captures" once each, apparently with reference to moveable property, to describe both the act of taking and the

property itself.' The term "captive" appears far more frequently and,
56 Instructions against Holland and France, 11th May 1666, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and
Custom 408,410 (cited in note 50).
57 Instructions against Holland and France,22nd May 1672, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and
Custom 411, 411 (cited in note 50) (referring to "an accompt or intelligence of their captures or
proceedings at sea"); Instructions against France,2nd May 1693, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 414, 418 (cited in note 50) (indicating that violations of the instructions will lead to liability
for damages others "susteine by any capture, imbezilment, demurrage, or otherwise").
58 Danishship captured under a Swedish commission to be restored by the Scottish Admiralty Court, 1676, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 93,94 (cited in note 50) (noting "all his Majestie's English subjects on board at the capture").
59 Letter of Marque for an East Indiaman, 1694, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 158,
158-59 (cited in note 50) ("And if you are outward bound at the time of such capture, you are to
carry such French ships.").
60 Warrantfrom the Lords of Admiralty to the Vice Admiralty Court of Jamaica to hear
prize cases, 1694, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 161, 161 (cited in note 50) (ordering the
court "to take cognizance of; and judicially to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prize, and reprizalls of all ships and goods alredy seized and taken, or which hereafter shall
be seized and taken").
61 Hugo Grotius, 1 The Rights of War and Peace (Liberty Fund 2005) (originally published
1625). This edition is based on a 1738 English translation of the Latin edition prepared by Jean
Babeyrac in 1720 which was extremely popular; George Washington owned a copy. Id at xi.
62 Hugo Grotius, 3 The Rights of War and Peace 597 (Liberty Fund 2005) ("[lt is in the
Power of the People to grant the Spoils to others, as well as other Things; and that not only after
Acquisition, but also before it; so that the Capture following, the Donation and the taking Possession are united.") (emphasis added); id at 685 (emphasis added):

There is great Reason to presume, that the Sovereign in having authorised Voluntiers, Partisans, and those who fit out Vessels to make Incursions upon the Enemy, and to keep the
Booty for themselves, was also willing, that the Whole, however great it were, should be theirs;
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consistent with modern usage, referred exclusively to a person. 6 "Captor" also appears frequently, and spans the two foregoing usages to
refer to someone who takes either property or prisoners. Grotius also
used the more common term "prize" to refer to people, as well as both

immoveable and moveable property.65
At the end of the seventeenth century, the term "capture" was used

infrequently, always as a noun, and it referred either to the act of taking
moveable property or to such property itself In British admiralty documents it was limited to takings that would result in a prize proceeding.
III. THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The use of the word "capture" increased dramatically in the eighteenth century, particularly as neutral rights became more important
during the early and mid-century wars. British documents, including
letters of marque and reprisal, reports from Admiralty, and the Prize
Acts, were generally available in America and from the beginning of
the century on they uniformly use "capture" to refer to moveable
property seized in a maritime conflict, or to the act of taking such
property. As in the seventeenth century, these documents do not, however, use "capture" as the language of authorization. International law

treatises saw a similar increase in the use of the word "capture," but
sometimes with a much broader meaning.

unless he had previously reserved a Part of it to himself. These Captures are generally not considerable enough with regard to the State, tho' they are so to the private Persons who take
them, and may therefore be left entirely to them, without Prejudice to the Publick.
In an earlier English translation, "capture" was used to refer to the act of seizing goods. Hugo
Grotius, Of the law of warre and peace 618 (T. Warren 2d ed 1654) (Clement Barksdale, trans)
("Neither ought the Capture of hostile goods in a just War be judged without sin.").
63
See, for example, Grotius 3 The Rights of War and Peace at 565-66, 573, 614-16,620-21,
639,661 (cited in note 62).
64 See, for example, id at 519, 603-05,608,629, 676.
65
See, for example, id at 581 (using "prize" in reference to moveable property); id at 588
(same); id at 593 (using "prize" to refer to a woman); id at 600 (using "prize" to refer to property
taken on water); id at 603 (using "prize" to refer to people and things). Samuel von Pufendorf, in
The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature, also an important work in eighteenth

century America, makes no mention of capture or prize. See generally Samuel von Pufendorf,
The Whole Duty of Man According to the Law of Nature (Liberty Fund 2003) (Andrew Tooke,

trans) (originally published 1673).
66

Henry J. Bourguignon, The FirstFederal Court: The FederalAppellate Prize Court of the

American Revolution, 1775-1787 184-85 (American Philosophical Society 1977); Anthony
Stokes, A View of the Constitution of the British Colonies, in North-America and the West Indies
at the Time the Civil War Broke out on the Continent ofAmerica 270-317 (B. White 1783).
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A. International Law
Emmerich Vattel has been described as the Founders' "clear favorite" among international authorities, and his 1758 book The Law
of Nations" was well known in colonial America.69 It uses the verb "seize" when discussing reprisals and letters of marque;M it also analyzes

the just causes of war and the declarations of war without using the
term "capture," and discussed neutral rights and contraband with language such as "attack," "a lawful prize," and "seize."" The word "cap-

ture" appears first at the end of the chapter on neutrality, where Vattel
refers to "prisoners and goods not yet perfectly in the enemy's power,
whose capture is, as it were, not yet fully completed."" This reference to
the act of taking is broad; it includes people and property. Vattel's dis-

cussions of postliminium, private persons in war, and wartime agreements also occasionally use the term "capture," both broadly to refer to
people and property (both moveable and immoveable)" and more narrowly to refer to property seized by maritime vessels. 74 The word "capture" is far more frequent -and invariably used in the narrower sense in the notes added in the 1854 edition put out by Joseph Chitty."
67

Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 Colum L Rev

830,847-48 (2006).
68 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations,or,Principles of the Law of Nature,Applied to
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (C.G. and J. Robinson 1797) (originally pub-

lished 1758).
69 See Bourguignon, The First Federal Court at 183 (cited in note 66) (describing Vattel as
the "most popular" European writer on the law of nations among American prize lawyers). See
also Bernard Bailyn, The IdeologicalOrigins of the American Revolution 27 (Belknap 1967) ("In

pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited ... Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, and
Vattel on the laws of nature and of nations, and on the principles of civil government.").
70 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations bk 2, ch 13, § 201 at 190 (London 1760) (originally published 1758) ("[I]f any one wrests or withholds from me my right, I may ... to indemnify
myself, deprive him also of some of his rights, or seize and detain them till I have obtained complete satisfaction."); id at ch 18, §8 343-45 at 249-50.
71 Id at bk 3, ch 7, §§ 112-14 at 40-41 (using "seize," "confiscate," and "lawful prize" with
respect to the right to search neutral vessels).
72
Id at § 132 at 46.
73
Id at ch 13, § 196 at 78; id at ch 14, § 206 at 84.
74 Vattel, The Law of Nations at ch 15, § 229 at 90 (cited in note 70) ("Persons fitting out
private ships to cruise on the enemy ... acquire the property of the capture.... The sovereign

either gives up to them the whole capture or a part."). See also id at ch 16, § 239 at 94.
75
Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations lv (T. & J.W. Johnson 1854) (Joseph Chitty, ed)
("[T]he sovereign ... has ... [the] sole power of deciding upon questions of booty, capture, prize,

and hostile seizure."); id at bk 3,ch 9, § 160 at 364 n 164 (referring to "the legal right of embargo
and capture, as it affects commerce"); id at § 165 at 365 ("[Whatever might be the legality of the
capture ... still the party had mistaken his remedy in prosecuting it."); id at ch 13, § 196 at 385 n
168 (directing readers to later sections "as to the effect of capture, as to moveables and immoveables"); id at § 202 at 390-91.
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Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, who published The Principles of Natural Law and The Principles of Politic Law7 in 1748, a decade before

Vattel's better known work, discussed the familiar range of issues related to the initiation and waging of war, including reprisals, when title
to property vests after it is taken in war, and differences between moveable and immovable property. Although "prize" is used frequently with
respect to moveable property, the term "capture" appears only once,

also to describe moveable property taken from an enemy during war.78
Use of the word "capture" became more common in the mideighteenth century. Vattel used it more than his predecessors had, and
in 1759 Richard Lee published A Treatise of Captures in War in Eng-

lish.9 The book begins by defining "war"; "capture" is used first on
page thirty-two in reference to the seizure of the governor of the Canary Islands in 1693." This is the book's only explicit use of the word
"capture" to refer to the taking of people; the word "captive," by contrast, is used frequently to refer to people." There are, however, a
chapter and a subchapter about the taking and treatment of people."
Given the title of the book, this suggests the reach of "captures" included people.n But these chapters do not use the word "capture" and
the book addresses a number of other topics related to war that would

not fall under any definition of "capture," including the definition of
76
Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Natural Law (J. Nourse 1752) (Thomas
Nugent, trans); Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, The Principles of Politic Law: Being a Sequel to the
Principlesof NaturalLaw (J. Nourse 1752) (Thomas Nugent, trans).
77 See, for example, Burlamaqui, The Principlesof Politic Law at bk 2, pt 4, ch 7, § 14 at 295
(cited in note 76) ("[T]he tranquility of nations, the good of commerce, and even the state of
neutrality, require that they should always be reputed lawful prize."); id at § 16 at 295-96 ("I see
no reason why the prizes, taken from the enemy, should not become our property as soon as they
are taken. For when two nations are at war, both of them have all the requisites for the acquisition of property, at the very moment they take a prize."); id at § 18 (similar); id at § 23 (similar).
78 Id at § 17 at 296 ("The greater or smaller difficulty the enemy may find, in recovering what
has been taken from him, does not hinder the capture from actually belonging to the conqueror.").
79 See Richard Lee, A Treatise of Captures in War (W. Sandby 1759). "Generously referred
to as a translator of Bynkershoek (less generously as 'an inferior hack writer of the Seven Years
War'), Lee closely patterns his treatise after the first book of Bynkershoek's Quaestionum juris
publici."TaraHelfman, Neutrality, the Law of Nations,and the Natural Law Tradition:A Study of
the Seven Years' War, 30 Yale J Intl L 549, 557 (2005). Only in 1803, when Quaestionum juris
publici was retranslated into English, was Bynkershoek revealed as the true author. Id at 557
n44.
80 Lee, A Treatise of Captures at 1-12,31,32 (cited in note 79).
81 See, for example, id at 56-57,63,67.
82 These are Chapter 4, Of the Nature of War between Enemies; and the rights which war
gives over the Persons of the Enemy; and of their extent and bounds, and Chapter 20, Section 4,
Hostages.Id at 68,262.
83 See Barron and Lederman, 121 Harv L Rev at 735 n 143 (cited in note 6).
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war, whether deceit is permitted in war, and whether a public declaration of war is required. Thus, the chapter on persons does not necessarily mean that the word "captures" itself would have been understood to extend that far, although, as cited above, in one instance the
book clearly uses the word "capture" to include people.
Throughout the book, "capture" is used relatively infrequently (at
least for a book with this title)," generally in reference to moveable
4 and sometimes
property,"
to the act of taking.VLee used "prize" more
often," generally denoting property taken at sea (by either public or
private vessels) for which the captor sought judicial determination of
ownership, as in the phrases "lawful prize, ' 9 "good prize, ' "of the
method of trying prize,"91 and "condemnation thereupon as prize.' ' "
This is arguably narrower than some similar uses of the term "capture," but there was also much overlap.93
The eighteenth century also brought changes in the use of letters
of marque and reprisal, which authorized the practice called privateering. The earliest use of reprisals was to permit private subjects aggrieved by the conduct of a foreign nation to seize the people or property of that nation to compensate for their own injuries. ' This use of

84

Lee, A Treatise of Captures at 1-39 (cited in note 79).

85 Lee next uses "capture" more than forty pages later in a discussion of when moveable

goods become the property of the captor. Id at 72.
86 Id at 95 ("if the Capture were brought into the port of a friend"); id ("an Adjudication of the
Capture in such a port"); id at 97 ("if the Capture is not brought to safety"); id at 98 ("if a privateer
was to be allowed one eighth part of the Capture"). See also id at 123,125,134 (more examples).
87 Id at 215 ("[Elvery Thing ought to have been restored to them which they had before
the Capture."); id at 222 (using the phrase "assist in the capture" twice). See also id at 238, 246
(more examples).
88 See Lee, A Treatise of Captures at 78 (cited in note 79) ("As to moveables, such as ships,
goods, and merchandize, or whatever else can become prize."); id at 32-33 (using "prize" interchangeably with "capture" to refer to a person); id at 112 ("The States General, in the year 1599, published an edict, concerning all goods indiscriminately; wherever found: whereby they declared all
persons and goods that belonged to the King of Spain, in all places whatsoever, to be good prize.").
See also id at 130,153,163,173,174,177,187,193,194,198-204,209,215 (more examples).
89 Id at 94,110,179; id at 142 ("justly condemned and confiscated as prize of war").
90 Id at 78,112,190.
91 The title of Chapter XVIII is: Of the Method of Trying Prizes taken in War: Appeals, and
Cost.Id at 238.
92 Lee, A Treatise of Capturesat 239 (cited in note 79).
93
As with other treatises, subsequent editions of A Treatise of Captures in War, including
the one issued in 1803, use "capture" with greater frequency. For example, in chapter XVI, on
page 77, the verb "taken" was changed to "captured" in the 1803 edition.
94 Lee, A Treatise of Captures at 40-41 (cited in note 79). But see Vattel, The Law of Nations at bk 2, ch 13, § 201 at 190 (cited in note 68).
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reprisals was already infrequent by the eighteenth century,9 and the
seizure of people through letters of reprisal had apparently become

obsolete, except in retaliation for a similar seizure.% General reprisals
functioned more like declarations of war; they gave private citizens
and sometimes public forces license to take property (or people, historically) to compensate for harms done to the nation as a whole.9
Letters of marque frequently referred to arming merchant vessels and

authorizing them to respond to any acts of aggression," although the
terminology varied considerably.
By the eighteenth century, however, the most common form of
privateering took place during war, as private vessels licensed with
letters of marque or reprisal sought to take enemy ships, especially
merchant ships, and claim them as prize. This became especially important during eighteenth-century wars in which England attempted
to cut off trade between Spain and France and their colonies.9 Captures of Spanish and then French vessels by American privateers
proved extremely lucrative for the owners and crews of many of the
vessels, made a "major contribution to British sea power by disrupting
Spanish and French commerce,"'O were the subject of thousands of
newspaper accounts, ' and brought many prize cases to the colonial
vice-admiralty courts. ' In this form, privateering did involve capturing
people, who could, at least early on, be ransomed by their captors. But

95 M. de Martens, An Essay on Privateers,Captures, and Particularlyon Recaptures 14-15
(E. and R. Brooke 1801) (Thomas Horne, trans); Richard Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral
Rights, 1739-1763 3 (Clarendon 1938); Grover Clark, The English Practicewith Regard to Reprisals by PrivatePersons, 27 Am J Intl L 694, 720-22 (1933); S.Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of
Redress Short of War, 2 Cambridge L J 60, 64-65 (1924); Albert E. Hindmarsh, Force in Peace:
Force Short of War in InternationalRelations 52-55 (Harvard 1933); Gardner Weld Allen, Massachusetts Privateersof the Revolution 9 (Mass Hist Socy 1927).
96 See Vattel, The Law of Nations at bk 2, ch 18, § 351 at 287 (cited in note 68); Lee, A
Treatise of Captures at 46 (cited in note 79).
97 Matthew Hale, 1 The History of the Pleas of the Crown 162-63 (E. Rider 1800).
98 See Martens, Essay on Privateersat 41 (cited in note 95).
99 Pares, Colonial Blockade and NeutralRights at 2 (cited in note 95).
100 Carl E. Swanson, American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748, 42 Wm &
Mary Q 357, 359 (1985).
101 Swanson, Predatorsand Prizes at 12-28 (cited in note 29). See also Eugene Kontorovich,
The PiracyAnalogy: Modern UniversalJurisdiction'sHollow Foundation,45 Harv Intl L J 183,21314 (2004) (emphasizing the popularity and significance of privateering).
102 See Swanson, Predatorsand Prizes at 360 n 9 (cited in note 29); Dorothy S. Towle, ed,
Records of the Vice Admiralty Court of Rhode Island, 1716-1752 35-42 (American Historical
Association 1936). American privateering and prize cases in colonial courts date back more than
a century before the Seven Years' War. See Marguerite Appleton, Rhode Island's First Court of
Admiralty, 5 New Eng Q 148, 150-52 (1932) (describing privateering and prize cases in Rhode
Island in 1653-when England was at war with the Dutch-and in 1694).
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that practice was phased out, and by the eighteenth century it appears
that prisoners were taken-at least by privateers -largely because
they happened to be aboard the vessels that were seized as prize.

Thus the eighteenth century saw a dramatic increase in the importance of neutral rights and prize, a decrease in the use of specific
reprisals, and a decrease in the importance of individual prisoners (at
least in the context of maritime war). Use of the word "capture" increased in international treatises both as a noun to describe the act of
taking property or the property itself, but also-this usage was less
frequent -more broadly to describe the act of taking people, towns, or
other property.
B.

British and Colonial Practice

The first significant, sustained use of the term "capture" came in
acts of Parliament beginning in the early eighteenth century. The Prize
Acts, usually passed after the initiation of hostilities by the Crown,
were designed in part to encourage the outfitting of private vessels
and enlistment in the Royal Navy. '°3 To this end, they frequently gave

the crew (and in the case of private vessels, the owners) the "sole interest and property" in any vessels or goods that they took which were
"adjudged lawful prize.''. ° They also employed a variety of measures
to try to ensure that prize proceedings were "speedy" and free of corruption. The word "capture" was used neither to refer to the act of

taking something, nor to the authorization to use force or take property.' But beginning in 1707,° many sections of the Prize Acts used
"capture" as a noun to refer to a vessel or goods that had been seized

See Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 6-7 (cited in note 95).
See, for example, Statute of 6 Anne, ch 37, §§ 2,3 (1707); Statute of 17 Geo 2 ch 34, §§ 1,
2 (1744); Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34, §§ 1, 2 (1756); Statute of 16 Geo 3, ch 5, § 3 (1776); Statute of
19 Geo 3, ch 67, §§ 1, 2 (1779).
105 The 1707 Act, for example, required the issuance of Commissions to private ships of war
"for the attacking, surprising, seizing, and taking, by and with such Ship or Vessel of her Majesty's Enemies," Statute of 6 Anne, ch 37, § 2 (1707), but capture was not used in this context. Similarly, the Act authorizes her Majesty to grant Commissions "for the attacking, surprising, taking
or destroying any Ships, Goods Moveables, and Immoveables ... " Id at § 14. See also Statute of
17 Geo 2, ch 34, §§ 1, 16 (1744) (using identical language); Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34, § 2 (1756)
(using similar language); Statute of 19 Geo 3, ch 67, § 2 (1779) (using similar language).
106 The first Prize Act, from 1692, see Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 3
(cited in note 95), did not use the term "capture." See also Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom at xii
(cited in note 50). Neither did earlier legislation dealing with naval and maritime issues. See, for
example, Statute of 15 Car 2, ch 7 (1663); Statute of 13 Car 2, ch 9 (1661); Statute of 12 Car 2, ch
18 (1660).
103
104
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but not yet condemned (or acquitted) as prize." These sources suggest
a narrow understanding of both the reach and type of control denoted

by the term "captures," limited to moveable property taken during
maritime conflict for later adjudication as prize.
British and colonial practice, outside of the Prize Acts, sometimes
used the term "capture" as a noun to refer to the act of seizing a vessel
or goods," or (as in the Prize Acts) to property itself.9 Both usages
occurred in the context of property that would be taken to a prize
court. As an example, "capture" was used often in the extremely influential report from 1753 on Frederick II's decision to withhold payment of interest on a loan as a reprisal for losses to Prussian vessels at
the hands of English privateers."' The report argued that the Prussian
107

One statute from 1707 included the following examples: "[e]xamination of the Persons

commonly examined in such Cases, in order to prove the Capture to be lawful Prize"; "and in
case no Claim of such Capture, Ship, Vessel, or Goods shall be duly entered or made in the usual
form"; "either to discharge and acquit such Capture, or to adjudge and condemn the same as
lawful Prize"; "and also of the Writings found taken in or with such Capture"; "proceed to such
Sentence, as aforesaid touching such Capture"; "whether such Capture be lawful Prize or not";
"Judge or Judges shall forthwith cause such Capture to be appraised by Persons"; "in case any
such Capture or Captures shall be adjudged not to be lawful prize"; "all such Captures as aforesaid, which shall be brought into any of her Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in America." See
Statute of 6 Anne, ch 37, §§ 4, 5, 6. For more examples of virtually identical language, see Statute
of 17 Geo 2, ch 34 (1744); Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34 (1756); Statute of 16 Geo 3, ch 5 (1776);
Statute of 19 Geo 3, ch 67, §§ 17-19 (1779).
108 See, for example, Charles Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of the Government of
Great-Britain,in Respect to Neutral Nations, during The Present War 21 (London 1759) ("those
Principles, on which this Right of Capture is grounded"); id at 22 ("It has been pretended, that
the Liberty of Navigation is destroyed by Means of these Captures."); id at 42 ("As for the Captures at Sea, they must be considered as belonging to the American War"); Letter from Penriceto
Burchett, 1721, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 256, 257 (cited in note 50) ("all things relating
to captures made in the British or Northern seas or Elsewhere"); Sentence of the Antigua Vice
Admiralty court, 1730, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 276, 276 (cited in note 50) (ordering
restitution of a French ship and declaring "the said seizure, or capture, and detention of the said
shallop" to be unlawful). For more examples, see Agreement between England and Spain as to
steps to be taken to put a stop to hostilities in American waters, 1732, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and
Custom 279, 280 (cited in note 50); A ProclamationBy the Honorable the President and Council
of the Province of Pennsylvania,April 1, 1748, in Early American Imprints, No 40473 (cited in
note 30); A state of the trade carriedon with the French on the island of Hispaniola 2, in Early
American Imprints, No 41170 (cited in note 30).
109 Warrantfor delivery to the EastIndia Company of a Frenchprize captured by one of their
ships without commission, 1768, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 400, 401 (cited in note 50)
("And whereas the said armed ship called the Revenge, not having at the time of the said capture
of the Indien any letter of marque or commission for war ... the said capture has been condemned by the sentence of Our said court as a droit of Admiralty.").
110 The report was authored by the law officers of the crown. See Report of the Law Officers
of the Crown, in Ernest Satow, The Silesian Loan and Frederick the Great77,77-106 (Clarendon
1915). Anthony Stokes calls this report one of "the most useful books to a lawyer in the Colonies,
in questions on captures at sea in time of War." Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies at
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reprisals were unlawful and used "capture" to describe both the act of
taking property.. and the property itself."2
Although the word "capture" was used with increasing frequency

starting in the mid-eighteenth century, it was still used as a noun, did
not generally refer to people, did not act as the language that authorized the taking of property, and remained far less common than the
older term "prize."" British materials from the American Revolution
generally followed the same pattern, and frequently borrowed language from earlier documents. On May 2, 1776, for example, the king

granted a commission to the High Court of Admiralty to "judicially [ ]
proceed upon all and all manner of seizures, forfeitures, captures, recaptures, prizes, and reprisals, of all ships and goods already seized and
taken, or which shall hereafter be seized and taken.". This language is
virtually identical to other commissions dating back nearly a century."'

277-78 (cited in note 66). See also Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom at xxii (cited in note 50)
(describing the report's influence).
111 See, for example, Report of the Law Officers at 78 (cited in note 110) ("Whatever is the
Property of the Enemy, may be acquired by Capture at Sea"); id at 83 ("but, from the Circumstances of the Capture"); id at 82, 86, 96 (more examples).
112 Id at 78 ("By the Maritime Law of Nations, universally and immemorially received,
there is an established Method of Determination, whether the Capture be, or be not, lawful
Prize."); id at 95-96 (more examples).
113 Like similar documents from the seventeenth century, a warrant from 1744 to issue
letters of marque uses the phrase "apprehend, seize and take," as well as "liable to confiscation"
and "prizes," but not the word "capture." Warrant to issue letters of marque for the Endeavour,
1744, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 304, 304-08 (cited in note 50). See also Letter from
Penrice to Corbett; as to contrabandand other goods in Hamburg ships,1744, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 308, 310 (cited in note 50) (using "seized as prize"; "seizure"; and "seized as
good and lawful prize"). Similarly, 1744 French Prize Regulations do not use the word "capture,"
but do use, many times, "legal prize" and "lawful prize." French prize regulations,1744, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 312, 312 (cited in note 50). See also Order of the Lords to captains of
H.M. ships to seize naval stores in neutral ships bound to an enemy port, 1745, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 321,321 (cited in note 50). Similar verbs were used in the colonies with respect
to the seizure of people. See A Proclamationby Samuel Shute, Esq., Captain Generaland Governor in Chief in and over His Majesties' Province of Massachusetts-Bayin New England, November 25, 1718, in Early American Imprints, No 39687 (cited in note 30) (ordering people to "apprehend and bring" escaped felons to his Majesties' Justice of the Peace); Proclamation by His
Excellency William Shirley, Esq., Governorof Massachusetts,October 18, 1744, in Early American
Imprints, No 40338 (cited in note 30) (similar); Proclamationby His Excellency William Shirley,
Esq., April 26, 1746, in Early American Imprints, No 40405 (cited in note 30) (similar); Proclamation By the HonourableRobert Hunter Morris,Esq; lieutenant governor,and commander in chief
of the province of Pennsylvania, and counties of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex, upon Delaware,
April 14, 1756, in EarlyAmerican Imprints, No 7754 (cited in note 30) (similar).
114 Stokes, Constitutionof the British Colonies at 331 (cited in note 66).
115 Compare id at 278-80 (providing an example from the Vice Admiralty Court of the
Leeward Islands from 1756) with Warrantfrom the Lords of the Admiralty to the Vice Admiralty
Court of Jamaica to hear prize cases, 1694, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 161, 161 (cited in
note 50). These commissions were thought necessary to give the Admiralty Courts (and Vice
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In 1778, instructions were issued for private vessels with letters of
marque and reprisal against France; like earlier instructions, they used

the phrases "person who was1 6present at the capture" and "to give intelleigence of their captures."
C.

Control of Captures by Crown and Parliament

Another way to think about the possible antecedents of the Constitution's language is to focus on how captures were regulated by the
British Parliament, Crown, and Admiralty courts. Maybe the allocation of authority among these institutions-if not the precise use of
the word "capture" itself-points to a discrete unit of power or powers
associated with the Constitution's eventual language.
Under British practice, the Crown traditionally initiated hostilities,"7 authorized letters of marque and reprisal (which were often issued by Admiralty),"8 proclaimed neutrality,"9 determined what
counted as contraband'2 and what property was otherwise subject to
Admiralty Courts) jurisdiction over prize cases. See Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights
at 78-79 (cited in note 95).
116 Instructionsfor the Commanders of such Merchant Ships or Vessels, who shall have Letters of Marque and Reprisalsfor private Men of War, againstthe French King, in Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies at 347,349,351 (cited in note 66).
117 Declaration of War 1739 (England against Spain), in David Bayne Horn and Mary Ransome, eds, English HistoricalDocument, 1714-1783 849, 851 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1957) (requiring "generals and commanders" of British forces and the "commissioners for executing the office of
our High Admiral of Great Britain," as well as others, to "do and execute all acts of hostility, in the
prosecution of this war against the King of Spain, his vassals and subjects," prohibiting the transportation of contraband goods to any of the Spanish territories, and providing that contraband goods
headed to Spanish territory be "taken" and "condemned as good a lawful prize"); Louis Xv's View
of the Seven Years' War, in Declaration of War 1756, in James Harvey Robinson and Charles A.
Beard, eds, 1 Readings in Modem European History 77,79 (Ginn 1908); Declarationof War 1702, in
Robinson and Beard, eds, 1 Readings in Modem European History; 1689 Declarationof War against
France,in Robinson and Beard, eds, 1 Readings in Modem European History 36,38 (we "Declare
War" and will "vigorously prosecute the same by Sea and Land").
118 Orderfor general reprisalsagainst the Dutch, 1664, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 48,49
(cited in note 50) (authorizing private vessels, "as well as his Majestie's fleet and shipps" to seize property belonging to the Dutch). See also Instructionsto the Lords of the Admiralty to issue a commission
to Sir Thomas Grantham to assist the East India Company against the King of Bantam, 1683, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 105, 105-10 (cited in note 50); Order in Counci 29 July 1778, in London
Gazette, No 11896 (July 28-Aug 1,1778) (ordering general reprisals against the French).
119 Proclamation neutrality,1668, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 70,70-75 (cited in note 50).
120 See Decision of the High Court of Admiralty 1745, in Frederic Thomas Pratt, Law of Contraband of War 39, 39-40 (London 1856); A proclamationto prevent the furnishing of the King of
Spaine and his subjects with provisions for shipping,or munition for the warres, and with victuas,
1627, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 433,433-35 (cited in note 42); The Louisa, Decision of the
High Court of Admiralty,March 3, 1745-46, in Pratt, Law of Contraband61, 61-62; Decision of the
High CourtofAdmiralty, June 29 1750, in Pratt, Law of Contraband198,198-99; Some of the Council to the Admiralty judges;specifying certain articleswhich, in their view, are contraband,and urging
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seizure, issued instructions for privateers and for public vessels,
dictated the treatment of prisoners aboard captured vessels, '2 ordered
the release of captured property when so desired,2' and determined
the division of prizes that went to the crews of public vessels." During
the seventeenth century, prize cases were treated, at least in part, as
matters of both state policy and law.'' Questions of power tended to
revolve around the relationship between admiralty and the Crown."
After the Revolution of 1688, direct executive control over prize cases
waned and Parliament increasingly enacted legislation controlling

some aspects of prize. '
By the eighteenth century, Parliament generally determined how
prize cases would be adjudicated,1 3" and it also regulated some aspects

their condemnation, 1665, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 57,57-58 (cited in note 50). See also
Satow, The Silesian Loan at 119 (cited in note 110).
121 Order in Council that the Admiralty Courtproceed against the French,1666, in Marsden,
ed, 2 Law and Custom 66,66--67 (cited in note 50); Order in Council explaining a late proclamation as to English goods in foreigners' prizes brought to England,1684, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and
Custom 111, 111-12 (cited in note 50).
122 See, for example, Instructions, 19th Dec, 1649, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 404,
404-07 (cited in note 50). See also Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 32-64 (cited in
note 95) (describing instructions).
123 A draught of certain Instructionsfor the ordering of the captains and companies serving
as man of warr in his Majestie's shipps 1626, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 416, 416-22
(cited in note 42).
124 Additional instructions as to prisoners taken in prizes, 1744, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and
Custom 430,430 (cited in note 50); Instructions for the Commanders of such Merchant Ships and
Vessels as may have Letters of Marque, or Commissions for Private Men of War against the King
of Spain, his Vassals and Subjects, November 30, 1739, in John Franklin Jameson, ed, Privateering
and Piracyin the Colonial Period:Illustrative Documents 347,349 (Macmillan 1923).
125 Order in Councilfor restitution,to their English owners, of goods captured by Portuguese
in a Spanish ship, 1665, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 59, 59-61 (cited in note 50). See also
Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 85-86 (cited in note 95) ("[I]n earlier times interference [by the government] with particular [prize] cases was very common.").
126 Proclamationas to prize, gun money, and pillage, 1664, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 51, 51-53 (cited in note 50). See also 1 The Laws, Ordinances,and Institutionsof the Admiralty of GreatBritain,Civil and Military 514 (A. Millar 1746) (referring specifically to a Declaration
by the king from March 29,1744).
127 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 86 (cited in note 95).
128 Opinion that the Lord Admirall can, without special authority from the crown, issue
commissions to capture pirates, 1579, in Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom 224, 224-26 (cited in
note 42); Orderin Council for restitution to their English owners of goods captured by Portuguese
in a Spanish ship, 1665, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 59,59 n 1 (cited in note 50); Opinion
of the judges as to the power of the crown to affect by treaty the right of English subjects to arrest
and claim their goods in prizes brought to England by a foreign captor,1689, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 124,124 n 1 (cited in note 50).
129 See Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 42-95 (cited in note 95).
130 Earlier, the King in Council controlled many of these aspects of prize. See, for example,
Rules and DirectionsAppointed by his Majesty in Councill to be observed by the High Court of
Admiralty in the Adjudication of Prizes, June 3,1672, reprinted in Pratt, Law of Contraband252-
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of how prizes would be distributed. For example, a 1756 act of Parliament... sought to encourage naval service and privateering by giving
the crews in His Majesty's Service, or privateers, the sole interest in
property they took as lawful prize.132 Consistent with the king's power
to authorize hostilities, the first sections of the act did not determine
what prize would be lawful, or who constituted the "enemy," but referred instead to the declaration of war by the king. They do not use
the word "capture."
The act goes on to regulate prize adjudication in detail, including
time limits on the proceedings; burden of proof; examination of witnesses; taking of security, appeals, appraisal, and sale of prizes; payment of judges and officers of the court of admiralty; customs and tariffs on imported prize goods (providing for a special bounty when
ships of war were taken); recaptures; and court martial. "Capture," as
noted above, was used with some frequency in this part of the act."'
Admiralty courts, following these procedures, determined whether captured property was good prize by applying the law of nations,
treaties, and, to a lesser extent, statutes and proclamations issued by
the Crown."' The Crown thus controlled the legality of prizes in a general sense through its power to declare war; these declarations not
only determined enemy status (rendering enemy property subject to
seizure under international law), they also at times provided for the
seizure of particular kinds of property. The 1762 Declaration of War
against Spain, for example, warned British citizens and all others not
to transport contraband to Spain, and provided that any doing so
would be condemned as "good and lawful prize... 5 The Crown also
53 (cited in note 120); Rules for the Admiralty court in the adjudication of prizes, 1665, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 53, 53-57 (cited in note 50). See also Pares, Colonial Blockade and
NeutralRights at 94-95 (cited in note 95).
131 An Act for the Encouragement of Seamen, and the more speedy and effectual Manning
his Majesty's Navy, Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34 (1756). The 1756 act is substantially identical to An
Act for the better Encouragement of Seamen in his Majesty's Service, and Privateers,to annoy the
Enemy, Statute of 17 Geo 2, ch 34 (1744). See 1 Laws, Ordinances,and Institutions at 513 (cited

in note 126).
1 Laws, Ordinances,and Institutions at 513-14, 556 (cited in note 126).
Id at 514-15 (declaring that, in cases of private capture, the prize "shall be shared by the
Owner's and Ship's Company who were the Captors"; "if no Claim of Capture shall be duly
enterr'd and attested on Oath").
134 Pratt, Law of Contraband at 128 (cited in note 120) ("Instructions cannot alter the law
of nations."). See also Marsden, ed, 1 Law and Custom at i-xxx (cited in note 42).
135 The Declarationof War of his Majesty King George III against the King of Spain, January
2, 1762, in 3 The British Magazine 41, 43 (Fletcher 1762). See also Pares, Colonial Blockade and
Neutral Rights at 92 (cited in note 95) (discussing similar language in the declaration of 1739 and
explaining that it violated treaties with Holland and France).
132

133
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concluded treaties, which frequently had detailed terms governing
naval warfare, and which played a key role in the resolution of many
prize cases.' Generally the Admiralty courts were supposed to issue
decisions independent of pressure from the Crown in individual cases,
but this relationship was somewhat unclear at times. "
In some respects the relationship between the Crown, admiralty,
and Parliament was actually more complicated than the foregoing
description suggests. The Instructions issued by the king, for example,
often repeated some language of the acts of Parliament, perhaps suggesting overlapping authority. Some of the Prize Acts provide that the
king could give "such further Rules to his Courts of Admiralty for the
Adjudication of Prizes, as by his Majesty, with the Advice of his Privy
Council, shall be thought proper," which may suggest that the Crown
retained some control over admiralty procedure.'' On the other hand,
the Prize Acts generally required admiralty to issue commissions to
privateers, ' a practice noted by William Blackstone. ' Parliament occasionally controlled what goods were subject to capture,'' even by
public forces, even in a declared war against Spain." '
136 Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral Rights at 90-91 (cited in note 95) (noting that
treaties took precedence over statutes, and usually were unfettered by the common law).
137 See, for example, Letter from Newcastle to Penrice (1740), in Marsden, ed, 2 Law Custom 289, 289-90 (cited in note 50); Judge of the Minorica Vice Admiralty Court, to the Lords;he
will follow their orders in condemning ships, 1746, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law Custom 323, 323 n 1
(cited in note 50).
138 Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34, § 32 (1756). See also Pares, Colonial Blockade and Neutral
Rights at 99 (cited in note 95) (citing this as evidence of "government interference" in prize
cases).
139 Statute of 6 Anne, ch 37, § 2 ("The Lord high Admiral ...shall ...cause to be issued
forth ...one or more Commission or Commissions."). Some contemporary sources seem to
argue that this language does not mean what it says: "nor was the King's Perogative in the least
diminished by them, but remain'd at the Common Law, to judge when 'twas expedient to grant
them." 1 Laws, Ordinances,and Institutions at 210 (cited in note 126).
140 William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws and Constitution of England *258
(Chicago 1979).
141 The 1707 Prize Act provides that it shall

not be lawful to any commander of any of her Majesty's Ships of War, Privateer or Merchant Ships Having Letter of Marque to attack, surprise, seize, take, destroy, or offer any Violence, Spoil, or Molestation whatsoever between Rio la Hacha ...on the Spanish Coast in
America ...or within five leagues at sea ... to any boat, goods ... belonging to any subject of
Spain who shall be concerned in any Intercourse of Trade with any of her Majesty's Subjects.
6 Anne, ch 37 § 2. The Act also extends previous prohibition on contraband to include goods
taken to Spain. Id.
142 Her Majesties Declaration of War against France and Spain, May 4, 1702, in William
Cobbett, 6 The ParliamentaryHistory of England from the earliestperiod to the year 1803 15-16
(Hansard 1812). See also Statute of 16 Geo 3, ch 5, § 1 (1776) (regulating "Trade and Intercourse" with the colonies and providing that certain ships and cargo "shall become forfeited to
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Thus the Crown usually authorized captures and (relatedly) determined what captures would be legal; these were powers that con-

trolled the initiation of war and compliance with international law.
The words "capture" or "captures" were used less frequently in this
context. Parliament generally controlled the procedural aspects of
prize adjudication and determined the division of property deemed
good prize; "capture" and "captures" were used much more frequently
here.
D.

Rules

The word "rules" -which should help determine the type of control over captures that the Constitution vested in Congress-was apparently not used in conjunction with the word "capture" in British
and international practice, thus there is no clear precursor to the
phrase "Rules concerning Captures." Moreover, "rules" referred to
norms generated by international law,"3 orders issued by the Crown,' "
and acts of Parliament. ' Substantively, it denoted what was subject to
capture as prize, " the division of prize money," ' and the procedures
his Majesty, as if the same were Ships and Effects of open Enemies, and shall be so adjudged,
deemed and taken in all Courts of Admiralty, and in all other Courts whatsoever").
143 See Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of Great-Britainat 6 (cited in note 108) ("those
Laws which are the established Rules of Conduct between Nations"); Report of the Law Officers
at 81 (cited in note 110) ("Tho' the Law of Nations be the general Rule, yet it may, by mutual
Agreement between two Powers, be varied or departed from."); id at 90 (noting that Prussian
property would "be[] condemned ... if the treaties with Holland were to be the rule between
Great Britain and Prussia"); Report of the Lord Admiral upon a petition by a Captainto be reinstated, 1705, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 201, 202 (cited in note 50) ("known rules and
practice of the sea").
144 See, for example, Statute of 29 Geo 2, ch 34, § 32 (1756) ("such further Rules and Directions to his Courts of Admiralty for the Adjudication of Prizes, as by his Majesty, with the Advice
of his Privy Council, shall be thought proper"); Statute of 16 Geo 3, ch 5, § 34 (1776) (similar
language); Rules and Directions at 252-53 (cited in note 130); Rules for the Admiralty court at 53,
53-58 (cited in note 130); Burlamaqui, Principles of Politic Law at pt 4, ch 7, § 18 (cited in
note 76) (referring to how long prize must be in an enemy's possession before it is lost: "every
sovereign has a right to establish such rules, in regard to this point, as he thinks proper").
145 Statute of 17 Geo 2, ch 34 (1744) ("[D]ivers Rules and Regulations are therein established for the Adjudication and Condemnation of prizes taken from the Spaniards."). See also
Statute of 20 Geo 3, ch 23 (1780) (using "several Regulations and Provisions respecting the
Grant of Commissions or Letters of Marque" to refer to prior legislation).
146 Rules and Directions at 252-53 (cited in note 130); Rules for the Admiralty court at 53,
53-58 (cited in note 130) (providing, for instance, that any ship containing Dutch goods be condemned as prize); Jenkinson, Discourse on the Conduct of Great-Britainat 6, 10 (cited in note
108) (citing "those laws which are the established rules of conduct between nations," explaining
that enemy property on neutral vessel can be seized as "lawful prize," and calling this a "rule");
Report of the Law Officers at 97 (cited in note 110) ("[Spanish captures] were not judged of by
Courts of Admiralty, according to the Law of Nations and Treaties, but by Rules, which were
themselves complained of in Revenue Courts.").
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that applied in prize adjudication.'o It is difficult to generalize, but
"rules" -regardless of their subject and source-were most often directed to the Admiralty courts,' 9 suggesting that the word includes the
trial and division of property and decisions about what could lawfully
be captured, but perhaps not authorization to make captures.
E.

"On Land and Water"

The phrase "on Land and Water" helps define the reach of the
Captures Clause. It could refer, as is generally assumed, to seizures
made by land or naval forces on land or on water. There is, however, a
narrower possibility. As we have seen, "captures" referred overwhelmingly to seizures made by maritime vessels, and "on Land and Water" could refer to such seizures, including those made on land. Lee's
Treatise of Captures, for example, writes about a Spanish ship chased
by the French into an English (neutral) port."O The Spanish "unloaded
their tackle, sails, etc, and carried them into the houses of inhabitants."
The French landed and took the Spanish property from houses,
"[hiereupon the King of England ordered all the captures to be restored, and directed his ambassador to prosecute the injury in
France.''. Although these kinds of captures on land were not particularly common, neither was usage of the term "capture" with respect to
the taking of property by land forces.
F.

Broad or Narrow?

This leaves us with three possible meanings for the phrase "Captures on Land and Water," based on British and colonial American
sources prior to the American Revolution. It could, most generally,
refer to people and all kinds of property taken from an enemy or to
redress harm inflicted by another country. Some international treatis147

See Burlamaqui, Principlesof Natural Law at bk 2, pt 4, ch 7 §§ 26-27 (cited in note 76).

148 Statute of 17 Geo 2, ch 34 (1744).
149 See, for example, Report of the Law Officers at 91 (cited in note 110) ("[A] New Rule,
for the Court of Admiralty, to decide by").
150 Lee, A Treatise of Capturesat 123 (cited in note 79).
151 Id at 124. For more examples of maritime forces acting on land, see Brown, 12 US (8
Cranch) at 139 (Story dissenting) (discussing the scope of prize jurisdiction); Worthington
Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 10 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 196
(Feb 26, 1778) (GPO 1908) (instructing privateers to "annoy the enemy by all the means in their
power, by land or water, taking care not to infringe or violate the laws of nations, or the laws of
neutrality"); Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 16 Journalsof the Continental
Congress 1774-1789 404 (GPO 1910) (same instruction); A ProclamationBy the Honorable the
President and Council of the Province of Pennsylvania,April 11, 1748, in Early American Imprints,No 40473 (cited in note 30) (similar instruction).
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es, in particular Vattel's influential work, support this reading. English
admiralty documents, however, used "capture" in a much more specific context to refer either to moveable property seized by maritime
vessels or to the act of seizing such property, including any seizures
made by maritime vessels "on Land" when the property would ultimately be claimed as prize. Works of international law began to use
captures in this more narrow sense, beginning to some extent with
Lee's Treatise of Captures in War. This is not surprising, as the domi-

nant questions of international law that arose during the Seven Years'
War involved the right to seize property at sea; "captures," like the
more common term "prize," was used frequently in the discussion of
these issues. Although the narrow usage was most common by the late
eighteenth century, it was not one that necessarily excluded the
broader reading. The third possibility is some intermediate positionsuch as property seized by both land and naval forces, but not persons.
What about "rules concerning"? The most common usage points
to a narrow understanding: determining the ownership interest in, and
procedures related to, seized property. This definition dovetails well
with the narrower definition of "captures on land and war" and best
mirrors the British division of power between the Crown and Parliament. But the admiralty documents and international treatises do not
foreclose an additional broader meaning: the power to determine
what gets taken in the first place and by whom.
Thus these sources do not yield two clearly distinct, mutually exclusive meanings for the language "Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water," but instead a continuum of possibilities. Moreover,
although the narrower usages were more common in British, colonial,
and international sources, this might mean that the phrase would have
been identified with this narrower meaning, or perhaps the phrase
would have been generally understood to have a broader meaning
with the narrower simply the most common usage.
We could push these questions further at this point, but it makes
more sense to turn first to the best evidence of the Constitution's language about captures, which emerges from the records of the Continental Congress during the Revolutionary War.
IV. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

As the Continental Congress began the process of waging war in
1775, the division of power in the United Colonies was obviously quite
different from what it was in Britain. Lacking a king (and even an executive branch), Congress was forced to do not only the work traditionally associated with Parliament, but also to some extent that of the
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king and even the Admiralty courts themselves. Questions about the
division of government power tended to revolve around a new axis:
the colonies versus the Continental Congress.' 2 And, with respect to

the taking of enemy property, the Continental Congress borrowed
some language from earlier English acts of Parliament and Orders in
Council, but it also began to use the term "capture" in a new way, expanding the type of control it denoted.
A.

"Captures" and the Continental Congress

Captures were an important issue for the Continental Congress
from the beginning."' During the fall of 1775, the Continental Congress and George Washington sought ways to both cut off British supplies to Boston and to seize British vessels and cargo for use by the
colonists."" On November 25, 1775, Congress passed a resolution stating that the colonies had fitted out armed vessels, and expressing con-

cern that some people who did not actually support the British government may suffer "unless some laws be made to regulate, and tribunals erected competent to determine the propriety of captures.'.'
The terms "laws," "made to regulate," and "captures" are closer to the

eventual text of the Constitution than any language found in British
legislation. The resolution went on to provide that all ships of war and
"armed vessels as are or shall be employed in the present cruel and

unjust war against the United Colonies" shall be "seized and forfeited." 6 In other words, this resolution, which was a "law[]" that "regulate[d]" "captures," authorized the seizure and condemnation of
certain British vessels.

152 Consider Richard P.McCormick, Ambiguous Authority: The Ordinances of the Confederation Congress,1781-1789,41 Am J Legal Hist 411,413-14 (1997).
153 See Charles Oscar Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration,Its
Policy, and Its Achievements 35-37 (Chicago 1906); Philip Morin Freneau, The British prisonship: a poem, in four cantoes -Viz. Canto 1. The capture (1781), in Early American Imprints,
No 17159 (cited in note 30).
154 Congress gave Washington instructions to intercept brigs coming from England loaded
with arms and powder "for the use of the continent." Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard
Hunt, eds, 3 Journalsof the Continental Congress 1774-1789 278 (Oct 5, 1775) (GPO 1906). See
also id at 293 (Oct 13,1775); id at 316 (Nov 2,1775).
155 Id at 371-75 (Nov 25,1775).
156 Id at 373. Transport vessels, however, were handled differently. Those having on board

"troops, arms, ammunition," and so on, were made liable to seizure but only the cargo could be
confiscated, unless the vessel belonged to "inhabitants of these United Colonies" (that is, to
loyalists), in which case the vessel as well as the cargo was subject to confiscation. Id. The list of
what could be seized was expanded on December 19, 1775, to include all vessels used to transport goods "to the United Colonies for use of the British Navy." Id at 437 (Dec 19,1775).
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In March of 1776, the Continental Congress listed its complaints
against Britain and concluded that it was justifiable for the colonies to
"make reprisals upon their enemies, and otherwise to annoy them,
according to the laws and usages of Nations.'.5 This resolution expli-

citly authorized privateering and expanded the property subject to
seizure by either private or public vessels to include "all ships and
other vessels" and "all goods, wares, and merchandizes, belonging to

any inhabitant or inhabitants of Great Britain.' 58 Noting that the colonists had many "friends in Great Britain" who could "suffer by captures," Congress "trust[ed]" that they will "impute it to the authors of
our common calamities.'.

9

The legislation, which authorized the use of

force (by both public and private vessels)' against an enlarged set of
British property, again used "captures" in the prologue to refer to that
exercise of force.

Congress issued corresponding instructions to commanders of
private ships of war in April 1776; these instructions authorized the
capture of contraband and directed the treatment of prisoners.'61 In
some respects these were similar to instructions issued by the English
Crown. They began with the authorization that "you may, by force of
arms, attack, subdue, and take all ships and other vessels belonging to

the inhabitants of Great Britain."'6' Well-known British instructions
included almost identical language. '6 Although the American instruc-

tions were far shorter than the English ones, both required in almost
157 Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 230 (Mar 22,1776) (GPO 1906).

at 230-31.
Id at 230.

158 Id
159

160 For discussions of captures made by the public vessels, see Paullin, The Navy of American Revolution at 164-78 (cited in note 153); Swanson, Predatorsand Prizes at 20-21, 50-51, 10003 (cited in note 29) (discussing prizes taken by the British Navy in the 1740s).
161 Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 253-54 (Apr 2, 1776) (cited
in note 157).
162 See Bourguignon, The First Federal Court at 55 (cited in note 66) (emphasizing the
relationship between this document and its British antecedents).
163 Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 253 (Apr 3, 1776) (cited in

note 157).
164 Instructionsfor privateers against France and Spain, 23rd Dec, 1704, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 420, 420 (cited in note 50) (permitting authorized privateers "to sett upon by
force of arms and subdue and take then men of war, ships, and other vessels whatsoever, as also
the goods, moneys, and merchandizes belonging to France and Spain"); Instructions for the
Commanders of such Merchant Ships or Vessels, who shall have Letters of Marque and Reprisals
for private men or war, against the French King, 1778, in Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies at 347, 348 (cited in note 66) ("[I]t shall be lawful for the Commanders of ships, authorized
by Letters of Marque and Reprisals, for private men of war, to set upon by force of arms, and
subdue and take the men of war, ships and vessels ... of King of France.").

2009]

1715

The Captures Clause

identical language that the papers of any captured vessels be presented to the judge "as they were received and taken, without any
fraud, addition, subtraction, or embezzlement";'6 both prohibited the

ransoming of prisoners; both required an affidavit;" and both warned
that failure to follow the instructions would result in forfeiture of the

commission and liability for damages. The American instructions, unlike the British, however, used the word "capture" in the title, to de-

note what the private ships of war were authorized to do: "Instructions to the commanders of private ships or vessels of war, which shall
have commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, authorizing them
to make captures of British vessels and cargoes.'1 67 This makes clear
that Congress here exercised a power that traditionally belonged to

the king, that of issuing instructions and authorizing the taking of
enemy property, and that this power came under the heading of "cap-

tures" as it was used by the Continental Congress.
On April 3, 1776, the Continental Congress resolved that anyone

outfitting a private ship of war must post a bond to ensure compliance
with the commission to take enemy property and with "certain Instructions therewith to be delivered." The form of bond provided that

the person making the obligation had applied for a "Commission, or
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, to arm, equip, and set forth to Sea the

said [blank] as a private Ship of War, and to make Captures of British
Vessels and Cargoes ... ."" The first part was standard language from
English bonds granted during the eighteenth century.' But the phrase
19

165 Instructions against the French King at 349 (cited in note 164); Ford and Hunt, eds, 4
Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 254 (Apr 3, 1776) (cited in note 157).
166 Instructions against the French King at 349 (cited in note 164); Ford and Hunt, eds, 4
Journalsof the Continental Congressat 254 (Apr 3,1776) (cited in note 157).
167 Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress at 253 (cited in note 157)
(emphasis added). The full title of the 1778 British instructions was:

Instructions for the Commanders of Such Merchant Ships or Vessels, who shall have Letters
of Marque and Reprisals for private Men of War, against the French King, his Vassals and
Subjects, or others inhabiting within any of his countries, territories, or dominions, by virtue
of our Commission granted under our Great Seal of Great Britain, bearing date the fifth
day of August 1778. Given at our Court at St. James's, the firth day of August 1778, in the
eighteenth year of our reign.
Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies at 347 (cited in note 66). See also Instructions from
1739, in Wyndham Beawes, Lex MercatoriaRediviva 221 (J. Moore and E. Comyns 1752) (using
an almost identical title).
168 Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 252 (Apr 3,1776) (cited in
note 157).
169 See Warrantfor issue of letter of marque; bail for good behavior,1719, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 246, 247-49 (cited in note 50) (noting that a captain had been "authorized by
letters of marque, or a commission for a private man of war, to arm, equip, and set forth to sea
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"to make Captures of [enemy property]" was not part of the standard
English bonds. Again, "captures" is used here by the Continental Congress as the language of authorization itself, not just to refer to the
taking of the vessel or the property itself. ° Subsequent bonds did not
always include this language, but did provide for the seizure of property which "shall be declared to be subjects of capture by any resolutions of Congress, or which are so deemed by the law of nations."''
Responding to complaints that American vessels were violating

international law, Congress issued a proclamation in May 1778 ordering captains and commanders "that they do not capture, seize or
plunder any ships or vessels of our enemies, being under the protections of neutral coasts."'" Like the earlier American documents, but
unlike their British antecedents, this proclamation uses "capture" as
language of authorization; here, it is used as a verb, and in the context
of setting out particular property to which authorization did not extend. This language was repeated in instructions to privateers issued in
May 1780.173
In response to requests for greater protections of neutral vessels,
a committee report listed property to be protected and provided that
public and private vessels must observe "the propositions above stated
the ship called the Happy Janet"). For an example of "caution or security" issued from the viceadmiralty court of St. Christopher in 1762, see The Form of a Caution or Security entered into on
the granting the Commission of a Private Ship of War, in Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies 315, 316 (cited in note 66) (stating that the bearer of the letter of marque is authorized to
"arm, equip, and set forth to sea the said schooner called the Pelican ... to set upon by force of
arms, and to subdue, seize and take the men of war ships, and other vessels ... belonging to the
French King, or any of his vassals andsubjects"). See also Bourguignon, The First Federal Court
at 56 (cited in note 66) (emphasizing the similarity between these bonds and those issued for
British privateers).
170 The goods and vessels subject to capture (by both public and private vessels) were expanded yet again on July 24, 1776 to include all ships and goods belonging to "any subject or
subjects of the King of Great Britain, except the inhabitants of the Bermudas, and Providence or
Bahama islands." Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 5 Journalsof the Continental Congress 1774-1789 606 (July 24, 1776) (GPO 1906). This exception, which according to
Madison was based on "compassion to the distresses of its inhabitants," was lifted in a resolution
of March 15, 1781 (except with respect to salt for Bermuda), when members of Congress argued
the exception made possible "a clandestine trade and intercourse" with the enemy. Worthington
Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 19 Journals of the Continental Congress 270 (Mar 15,
1781) (GPO 1912).
171 Ford and Hunt, eds, 16 Journals of the Continental Congress at 406 (May 2, 1780) (cited
in note 151).
172 Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 11 Journals of the Continental
Congress 1774-1789 486 (May 9, 1778) (GPO 1908) (proscribing "piratical" conduct because
Congress had "received information and complaints" about violence to neutral vessels).
173 Ford and Hunt, eds, 16 Journals of the Continental Congress at 407 (May 2, 1780) (cited
in note 151) ("[Y]ou are not to capture, seize or plunder.").
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as a rule of conduct.".. Corresponding instructions from the Board of
Admiralty provide that "[y]ou are not to seize or capture any effects
belonging to the subjects of Belligerent Powers on board Neutral Vessels except contraband goods.' 7. Here the term "rule of conduct" referred to the instruction not to capture certain kinds of property. The
word "rules" also referred to the body of law applied by courts in adjudicating captures cases.'
An ordinance from March 27, 1781 -weeks after the ratification
of the Articles of Confederation -also mixed language drawn from
English sources with this new use of the word "capture." The ordinance was entitled: "An ordinance relative to the capture and condemnation of prizes."'" Like the resolution from March 1776, this title,
which has no clear antecedents in English practice, comes very close
to the language the Constitution would eventually use: "Rules concerning Captures." Also, like the earlier American resolution, this one
authorized the taking of property by both private and public vessels:
[T]he fleets and ships of these United States, as also all other
ships and vessels commissioned by letters of marque or general
reprisals ... shall and may lawfully seize all ships ... belonging to
the King or Crown of Great Britain, or to his subjects or others
inhabiting within any of the territories or possessions of the aforesaid King of Great Britain.7

174 Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 18 Journals of the Continental
Congress864-66 (Sept 26,1780) (GPO 1910).
175 Id at 1008 (Nov 3,1780).
176 Acts and laws, made and passed by the General Court or Assembly of the English Colony
of Connecticut, in New-England, in America, holden at Hartford, in said Colony (May 1776), in
EarlyAmerican Imprints,No 14689 (cited in note 30) ("That the respective County courts in this
Colony be, and they are hereby authorised ... to try judge and determine as in other Cases,
concerning all Captures that have or shall be taken and brought into the said respective counties.
And that the Civil Law, the Law of Nations, and the Resolutions of Congress be the Rule of their
Adjudications, Determinations and Proceedings therein."); Worthington Chauncey Ford and
Gaillard Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress 1774-1789 1153, 1158 (Dec 4, 1781)
(GPO 1912) (providing that "[t]he rules of decision in the several courts shall be the resolutions
and ordinances of the United States in Congress assembled, public treaties when declared to be
so by an act of Congress, and the law of nations, according to the general usages of Europe.
Public treaties shall have the pre-eminence in all trials.").
177 Ford and Hunt, eds, 19 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 314 (Mar 27, 1781) (cited
in note 170). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 1153 (Dec 4,
1781) (cited in note 176) ("An ordinance, ascertaining what captures on water shall be lawful. In
pursuance of the powers delegated by the Confederation in cases of capture on water.").
178 Ford and Hunt, eds, 19 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 315 (Mar 27, 1781) (cited
in note 170).
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The 1781 resolution expanded the British property subject to capture,
but it still included one exemption: it did not "extend to authorize the
capture or condemnation of any vessel belonging to any inhabitants of
Bermudas, which, being loaded with salt only, may arrive in any of
these United States, on or before the first day of May next." 9 Here
again, unlike earlier English documents, the word "capture" is used in
connection with the authorization (or not) to take property.'O In other
sections, the 1781 resolution used language identical to that found in
English documents. It ordered, for example, courts of admiralty "judicially to proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes
and reprisals" and determine them "according to ... the laws of na-

tions.'.' This language is identical to that used in 1694 English documents discussed above."
These documents show the extent to which the Continental Congress regulated the use of force against Great Britain through rules
related to captures. The rules were tailored to suit specific diplomatic
and strategic goals, and to ensure compliance with international law.
The treatment of neutral vessels illustrates these points well. The May
1778 resolution discussed above resulted from reports to Congress
that American vessels had been violating the rights of neutrals by capturing enemy vessels "whilst under the protection of neutral coasts,
contrary to the usage and custom of nations.'' .. So Congress directed
all captains of any American armed vessel not to capture such vessels
and to "govern themselves ... [in accordance with] the instruction and

resolutions of Congress; particularly that they pay a sacred regard to
the rights of neutral powers."' In 1780, Congress worked to develop a
response to the agreement on neutrality entered into by some of the
European powers, and it eventually agreed to adopt those same prinId at 316.
See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journals of the Continental Congress at 1156 (cited in
note 176) ("Besides those who are duly authorised to make captures by a special commission.");
179
180

Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 22 Journals of the Continental Congress

1774-1789 10 (Jan 8, 1782) (GPO 1914) (providing for rules concerning proceeds of a capture of
an enemy ship "by any armed vessel belonging to the United States, and duly authorised to make
captures").
181 Ford and Hunt, eds, 19 Journals of the Continental Congress at 315 (Mar 27, 1781) (cited
in note 170). See also id at 364 (Apr 7,1781) (ordering the Board of Admiralty to generate "regulations for the conducting and governing the vessels of war of the United States and other
armed vessels").
182 See note 60 and accompanying text.
183 Ford and Hunt, eds, 11 Journals of the Continental Congress at 486 (May 9, 1778) (cited
in note 172).
184 Id (proclaiming that willful violators of this order will not be protected from the punishment of other states).
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ciples. The resolution, which expanded the rights of neutrals in several
ways, directed "[tlhat all captains and commanders of armed vessels
whether public ... or private" were "strictly enjoined and required to
observe the propositions above stated as a rule of conduct and govern
themselves accordingly...
These carefully calibrated rules regulating the capture of neutral
property, as well as those regulating the capture of British property,
were not intended merely to determine the legal title to property already taken. Instead, they determined whether the property could be
taken at all. The resolution protecting neutral vessels and property, for
example, would mean little if public vessels could seize such property
notwithstanding the rule. The purpose of the rule, in other words, was
to limit the kinds of enemy property that could be seized, not simply
to determine ownership. The two issues were linked, of course; title
could only be perfected in property that Congress had subjected to
seizure. But the purpose of Congress's actions was not limited to determining legal title but was instead designed to control the seizure of
property and control the risk that other nations would join the war
against the United States.
It is unsurprising that Congress controlled the seizure of property
by public as well as private vessels during the Revolutionary War.
Congress, after all, controlled virtually every aspect of naval policy
during the war, notwithstanding Esek Hopkins's title as "Commander
in Chief' of the fleet."' On January 5, 1776, for example, the Naval
Committee issued a precise set of orders detailing where Hopkins
should sail.ln By late summer 1776, Congress was disappointed with
Hopkins's performance and resolved that "during his cruize to the
southward," Hopkins "did not pay due regard to the tenor of his instructions, whereby he was expressly directed to annoy the enemy's
ships upon the coasts of the southern states; and, that his reasons for
not going from Providence immediately to the Carolinas, are by no
means satisfactory..... Thus, in this sense, the Continental Congress's
185 Ford and Hunt, eds, 18 Journals of the Continental Congress at 864-66 (Sept 6, 1780)
(cited in note 174); id at 1008 (Nov 3, 1780).
186 See McCormick, 41 Am J Legal Hist at 413 (cited in note 152) ("The early Congress is
best conceptualized as a directorate, exercising every power relevant to the prosecution of
war.".
187 See Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution at 56 (cited in note 153) (explaining that
Hopkins had been ordered to sail "directly for Chesapeake Bay ... [and] strike the enemy's fleet").
188 Ford and Hunt, eds, 5 Journals of the Continental Congress at 659 (Aug 15, 1776) (cited
in note 170). For other examples of the Continental Congress exercising detailed control over
tactics and strategy with respect to public armed vessels, see id at 631 (Aug 5, 1776); id at 846
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exclusive ability to control public vessels by regulating captures was
not particularly important from a separation of powers perspective;
with no real executive branch in place, Congress controlled many aspects of war prosecution. The key question is how much of this power
the Captures Clause of the Constitution vested in Congress.
B.

Prize Money and Courts
The Continental Congress also determined how prize money for

captured vessels would be allocated and attempted to provide for
courts that would resolve individual cases of capture. On November 25, 1775, Congress provided that for vessels fitted out by one of

the colonies or at the continental charge, two-thirds of value of the
prizes it took would go to the government that fitted her out, while
one-third would be divided among the captors. 9 This aspect of Revo-

lutionary War legislation was very similar to the eighteenth-century
English prize acts.
The November 1775 ordinance also recommended that the colonies establish courts to determine captures, or "give jurisdiction to the

courts now in being for the purpose of determining concerning the
captures."' ' The relationship between colonial and congressional judicial power over captures proved to be controversial throughout the war.
The colonies already had British vice-admiralty courts, which traditionally decided prize cases; this arrangement allowed British vessels to

bring prizes to the colonial courts for adjudication rather than taking
them back to England. These courts-which lacked juries-were also

responsible for enforcing the trade laws against the colonists, rendering
them extremely unpopular.' 9' Not surprisingly, when the Continental
Congress recommended that colonies provide courts to resolve cap(Oct 3, 1776). See also Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 6 Journals of the
Continental Congress 1774-1789 882 (Oct 16, 1776) (GPO 1906); Worthington Chauncey Ford
and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 15 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 1217 (Oct 28, 1779)
(GPO 1909) (creating a Board of Admirality "to superintend the naval and marine affairs of
these United States" and authorizing it "to form proper plans for increasing the naval force of
the United States").
189 Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journals of the Continental Congress at 374-75 (Nov 25, 1775)
(cited in note 154). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 6 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 883
(Oct 3,1776) (cited in note 188).
190Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journals of the Continental Congress at 373-74 (Nov 25, 1775)
(cited in note 154).
191 See, for example, SC Const of 1776, preamble (listing the expansion of the admiralty
courts as one of the complaints against Great Britain). See also Appleton, 5 New Eng Q at 153-54
(cited in note 102) (describing colonial Rhode Island's opposition to English efforts, beginning in
1696, to expand the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts and to ensure that their judges were "royal
appointees independent of colonial influence").
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tures cases, it also recommended that they provide for jury trials; most
did so." The Continental Congress had the power to determine appeals
from these colonial courts in cases of capture 19 or, later, to establish a
court to hear such appeals. British admiralty courts and the Privy
Council had previously exercised appellate review over vice-admiralty
courts, although many details of how this worked remain unclear."
Individual prize cases created significant friction between the colonies and the Continental Congress. In the case of the Active, for example, a protracted conflict arose over the power of Congress to review a jury determination on appeal." Congress discussed the case a
number of times and eventually issued a resolution emphasizing that
the "legality of all captures on the high seas must be determined by the
law of nations," that the power of war and peace was entrusted to Congress, and that Congress must be able to avoid the violations of treaties
or the law of nations that could result from a jury verdict.'93 After much
debate, the Continental Congress formed a court of appeals in 1780,
and then passed "an Ordinance Relating to Captures," which consolidated and superseded all previous legislation on the subject."

See, for example, Acts and laws, made and passed by the General Court or Assembly of
the English Colony of Connecticut, in New-England, in America, holden at Hartford, in said Colony at 419 (cited in note 176); An act to empower the Court ofAdmiralty to have jurisdiction in
all cases of capture of the ships and other vessels of the inhabitantsof Great-Britain,Ireland,the
British West-Indies, Nova Scotia, and East and West Florida;to establish the trial by jury in the
Court of Admiralty in cases of capture, andfor the other purposes therein mentioned (South Caro192

lina Apr 11, 1776), in Early American Imprints,No 43162 (cited in note 30). Delaware (and Pennsylvania after 1780) did not use juries at all. Maryland, North Carolina, and Massachusetts did
not always use them. See Bourguignon, The FirstFederalCourt at 192 (cited in note 66).
193 Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 374 (Nov 25, 1775) (cited
in note 154).
194 Ford and Hunt, eds, 15 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 1220 (Oct 29, 1779) (cited
in note 188).
195

See Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations

177-213 (Columbia 1950).
196 See Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 13 Journalsof the Continental
Congress 1774-1789 135 (Feb 2,1779) (GPO 1909); id at 284 (Mar 5,1779). See also Worthington
Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 14 Journalsof the Continental Congress 1774-1789 626,

635 (May 22, 1779) (GPO 1907); Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 20 Journals
of the ContinentalCongress 1774-1789 762-64 (July 18,1781) (GPO 1909).
197 Ford and Hunt, eds, 13 Journals of the Continental Congress at 283-84 (Mar 5, 1779)

(cited in note 196).
198 Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 961-64 (Sept 14, 1781)
(cited in note 176). State constitutions drafted during the Revolutionary War did not use the
word "capture," with the exception of Georgia's 1777 constitution, which explicitly provided for
the judicial resolution of captures cases. Ga Const of 1777 Art XLIV.
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C. Captures and Prisoners
The Continental Congress used "capture" and "captured" with

reference to people, and it also determined the treatment of prisoners.
George Washington frequently sought guidance from the Continental
Congress as to the treatment and exchange of prisoners,'" and it
passed a variety of resolutions on this topic. In 1777, it directed that all
subjects of Great Britain taken on "board any prize made by any continental vessel of war, be hereafter considered as prisoners of war, and
treated as such." Other resolutions required private armed vessels to

bring prisoners to shore (or risk losing their commissions)

'

directed

that crews of captured vessels were to be confined on board prison

ships,"' and decided the terms upon which prisoners would be exchanged or paroled.23 Instructions to private armed vessels included
(as their English antecedents had) directions to treat prisoners humanely and not to ransom any persons on board captured vessels." '
Moreover, the Continental Congress used "capture" and "captured" to describe people, as did other documents from the American
Revolution. A 1778 resolution included, for example, the phrase "if

the enemy will not consent to exempt citizens from capture, agreeably

199 See, for example, Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journals of the Continental Congress at 357-58
(Nov 17,1775) (cited in note 154); Ford and Hunt, eds, 15 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at
1018 (Sept 3, 1779) (cited in note 188); Ford and Hunt, eds, 16 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 47-52 (Jan 13, 1780) (cited in note 151); Ford and Hunt, eds, 18 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 1028-31 (Nov 7, 1780) (cited in note 174).
200 Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 9 Journals of the Continental Congress 1774-1789 776 (Oct 6, 1777) (GPO 1907). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the
Continental Congress at 370 (May 21, 1776) (cited in note 157); Ford and Hunt, eds, 5 Journalsof
the Continental Congress at 630 (Aug 5, 1776) (cited in note 170).
201 Ford and Hunt, eds, 16 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 48 (Jan 13, 1780) (cited in
note 151) (voicing concern about the "various directions" being taken by "divers commissaries
independent of each other").
202 Ford and Hunt, eds, 14 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 837 (July 15, 1779) (cited
in note 196) (providing for "crews of vessels captured from the enemy, to be confined on board
prison ships").
203 Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journals of the Continental Congress at 428 (Dec 15, 1775) (cited
in note 154); Ford and Hunt, eds, 5 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 598-99 (July 22, 1776)
(cited in note 170); id at 665-66 (Aug 17, 1776); Ford and Hunt, eds, 16 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 48-52 (Jan 13, 1780) (cited in note 151); Ford and Hunt, eds, 18 Journals of the
Continental Congress at 1029 (Nov 7, 1780) (cited in note 174). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 10
Journalsof the Continental Congress at 295 (Mar 30, 1778) (cited in note 151).
204 Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 254 (Apr 3, 1776) (cited in
note 157). See also Instructionsto the Commanders of Private Ships or Vessels of War, Issued by
His Excellency, William Greene, Esquire, Governor,Captain-General,and Commander in Chiefof
and over the State of Rhode Island and ProvidencePlantations (June 28,1779), in Early American
Imprints,No 43690 (cited in note 30).
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to the law of nations";... in 1779 it referred to "prisoners [ ] captured
by Continental vessels of War"; and in 1781 the Continental Congress discussed issues "relating to Mr. Laurens's capture." John
Dodge published a pamphlet about his capture entitled "A Narrative
of the Capture and Treatment of John Dodge by the English at De-

troit."

In the diplomatic correspondence from the Revolutionary

War, "captures," "capture," and "captured" are used more than a 150

times, with about 70 percent of the references to property or vessels,
about 20 percent to individual persons or troops, and about 10 percent
to real property.
The foregoing provides some support for the claim that "rules"

concerning "captures" -the language in the Constitution-might be
understood to include the treatment and exchange of captured prisoners. But there is countervailing evidence. Even during the Revolutionary War, "capture" was used overwhelmingly to refer to property;

205 Ford and Hunt, eds, 10 Journals of the ContinentalCongress at 295 (Mar 30, 1778) (cited
in note 151).
206 Ford and Hunt, eds, 13 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 105 (Jan 23, 1779) (cited
in note 196). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 9 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 1052 (Dec 24,
1777) (cited in note 200); Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds, 12 Journalsof the
Continental Congress 1774-1789 934 (Sept 19, 1778) (GPO 1908); Ford and Hunt, eds, 19 Journals of the Continental Congress at 363 (Apr 7, 1781) (cited in note 170); Ford and Hunt, eds, 20
Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 673 (June 18, 1781) (cited in note 196).
207 Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 780 (July 23, 1781) (cited
in note 176). See also Ford and Hunt, eds, 18 Journals of the Continental Congress at 864 (Sept
26, 1780) (cited in note 174).
208 John Dodge, A Narrative of the Capture and Treatment of John Dodge by the English at
Detroit (1779), in Early American Imprints, No 16262 (cited in note 30). See also Moses van
Campen, A narrative of the capture of certain Americans, at Westmorland, by savages; and the
perilous escape which they effected, by surprizing specimens of policy and heroism. To which is
subjoined, some account of the religion, government, customs and manners of the aboriginesof
North-America (1780), in Early American Imprints, No 18273 (cited in note 30); Timothy Dwight,
A sermon, preached at Northampton, on the twenty-eighth of November, 1781: occasioned by the
capture of the British Army, under the command of Earl Cornwallis (1781), in Early American
Imprints, No 17144 (cited in note 30); Nathan Fiske, An orationdelivered at Brookfield, Nov 14,
1781. In celebration of the capture of Lord Cornwallis and his whole army at York-Town and
Gloucester,in Virginia, by the combined army under the command of His Excellency General
Washington, on the 19th of October, 1781, in Early American Imprints, No 17153 (cited in note
30); Abb6 Robin, New travels through North-America:in a series of letters; exhibiting, the history
of the victorious campaign of the allied armies, under His Excellency GeneralWashington, and the
Count de Rochambeau, in the year 1781. Interspersed with political, and philosophical observations, upon the genius, temper, and customs of the Americans; also narrations of the capture of
GeneralBurgoyne, and Lord Cornwallis,with theirarmies 42 (1783), in Early American Imprints,
No 18167 (cited in note 30).
209 See
U.S.
Congressional
Serial
Set,
online
at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/index.html (visited Dec 18, 2009) (database search performed
July 28,2008).
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the references to people are far less frequent. This is especially true in
the legislation from the Continental Congress with titles or language
that comes closest to that used in the Constitution.
Moreover, the word "captures" itself-with an "s" but without a
specific noun as a referent-was apparently not used in conjunction
with people. The diplomatic correspondence, for example, includes
"the capture of Lord Cornwallis,"'' "Mr. Laurens' capture, '' " and "to
capture British invading troops.,1 12 But the word "captures," used (as
in the text of the Constitution) without referring to a specific taking,
did not refer to people, as in "yet it becomes important from the number of captures made on this coast 21 3 or "an ordinance of Congress,
which comprises all their former resolutions with respect to captures.". Finally, as discussed below, it seems clear that the language in

the Articles of Confederation about "captures" did not refer to
people.

210 Robert Morris to Luzerne (Nov 3, 1781), in Francis Wharton, ed, 4 The Revolutionary
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States 818, 820 n * (GPO 1889) (discussing a "Te
Deum, sung on account of the capture"). See also Dana to Livingston (Dec 21, 1782), in Francis
Wharton, ed, 6 The Revolutionary Correspondence of the United States 156, 157 (GPO 1889)
(referring to "the capture of Lord Cornwallis and his army").
211 Report of Communications from the French Minister (July 25, 1781), in Wharton, ed, 4
Revolutionary Correspondenceat 600,601 (cited in note 210).
212 Report of Foreign Affairs, to the Commissions at Paris (Oct 18, 1777), in Francis Wharton,
ed, 2 The Revolutionary Correspondenceof the United States 415 (GPO 1889).
213 Livingston to Admiral Digby (Apr 12, 1783), in Wharton, ed, 6 Revolutionary Correspondence 369,370 (cited in note 210). See also A. Lee to Committee of Foreign Affairs (Nov 27,
1777), in Wharton, ed, 2 Revolutionary Correspondence429,430-31 (cited in note 212) ("Captain
Hart, has taken an English merchantman in the mouth of the Garonne. These captures have
given great offense to the two courts."); J. Adams to President of Congress (June 2, 1780), in
Francis Wharton, ed, 3 The Revolutionary Correspondence of the United States 758, 759 (GPO
1889) ("... and other artifices to the end to prevent the capture of their vessels. From this have
followed the numerous captures and detentions."); Franklin to Torris (May 14, 1780), in 3 Revolutionary Correspondence740, 741 ("[A] void the trouble and expense likely to arise from such
captures"); Jay to Livingston (Apr 28, 1782), in Francis Wharton, ed, 5 The Revolutionary Correspondence of the United States 336, 342 (GPO 1889) ("the evidence of captures in the manner
specified in the above-mentioned order").
214 Livingston to Franklin(Dec 16, 1781), in Wharton, ed, 5 Revolutionary Correspondence
53, 53 (cited in note 213). See also Livingston to Luzerne (Dec 21, 1781), in Wharton, ed, 5 Revolutionary Correspondence67, 67 (cited in note 213) ("an extract of my letter to Dr. Franklin on
the subject of the late ordinance of Congress relative to captures"); Livingston to Dana (Mar 2,
1782), in Wharton, ed, 5 Revolutionary Correspondence209, 212 (cited in note 213) ("I enclose
an ordinance relative to captures which will show the respect paid by these States to the armed
neutrality. It will be evident to you that this is not a mere empty compliment.").
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D. The Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation agreed upon by the Continental
Congress in 1777 and ratified on March 1, 1781, provided Congress
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace
and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article ...of
establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land
or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land
or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided
or appropriated-of granting letters of marque and reprisal in
times of peace- appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures,
provided that no member of Congress shall be appointed a judge
of any of the said courts."'
This language confirms the observations made in the preceding
parts. The Continental Congress assumed powers traditionally associated largely with the Crown- "determining on peace and war" and
that of "establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on
land or water shall be legal"-and the terms "rules" and "captures"
are used to describe part of that power. Congress had, as we have
seen, the exclusive power to determine the captures that both public
and private vessels could make, and this is the language used to identify that power."' The Articles of Confederation go on to use different
language to describe the distinct power to determine "in what manner
prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States
shall be divided or appropriated."2 ' 7 This is part of what the traditional
Prize Acts did-determined how prizes made by public vessels would
be divvied up as between the government and various members of the
crew. Here, that power is given to Congress, excluding vessels within
215 Articles of Confederation Art VII (1777). There is no mention of "captures" in Benjamin
Franklin's proposed articles of confederation. Worthington Chauncey Ford and Gaillard Hunt, eds,
2 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress 1774-1789 195-99 (GPO 1905). The final language seems to
be close to that of John Dickinson's draft from July 12, 1776:

Of establishing Rules for deciding in all Cases, what Captures on Land or Water shall be legal-In what Manner Prizes taken by land or naval Forces in the Service of the United
States shall be divided or appropriated-Granting Letters of Marque and Reprisal in Times
of Peace ...Establishing Courts for receiving and determining finally Appeals in all Cases
of Captures.
Ford and Hunt, eds, 5 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 550 (cited in note 170).
216

See Part IV.A.

217

See note 215 and accompanying text.
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the service of the colonies. This second part of the captures power also
points away from a narrow understanding of "captures on land." The
phrase could mean, as we have seen, captures by naval forces of property on land, but this understanding is eliminated by the language
"taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States."
The third aspect of Congress's power over captures under the Ar-

ticles of Confederation was that of "establishing courts for receiving
and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures. 2 .8 The Continental Congress devoted substantial time to this aspect of its authority,
which was the only seriously contested issue related to the power over

captures during the Revolutionary War.

'

The language used in the Articles of Confederation did not reach
persons, however. The middle part quite obviously did not, and neither
did "appeals in all cases of captures," because cases of capture deter-

mined ownership of property, not the rights or status of individuals.
The initial language "what captures on land and water shall be legal"

might seem to apply to people, but this is not the best reading. In both
British and American documents a "lawful" or "legal" capture referred to property, the taking of which had been duly authorized by a

sovereign, and which was consistent with international law." This
usage continued in the documents issued by the Continental Congress
after the ratification of the Articles of Confederation, as in "it shall be
lawful to capture and to obtain condemnation of the property."'2

218

Id.

219

See Part IV.B.

Ford and Hunt, eds, 3 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 373 (Nov 25, 1775) (cited in
note 154) (referring to property in discussing the necessity of "laws [to] be made to regulate, and
tribunals erected competent to determine the propriety of captures..."); Ford and Hunt, eds, 13
Journals of the Continental Congress at 283-84 (Mar 5, 1779) (cited in note 196) ("[N]o finding of a
jury in any court of admiralty, or court for determining the legality of captures on the high seas can
or ought to destroy the right of appeal and the re-examination of the facts reserved to Congress.");
id (resolving that, referring to property disputes decided by courts, "the legality of all captures on
the high seas must be determined by the law of nations"); id at 284 (noting that a control by appeal
should extend to "the decisions of juries as judges in courts for determining the legality of captures
on the sea"); Ford and Hunt, eds, 18 Journals of the Continental Congress at 865 (Sept 26, 1780)
(cited in note 174) ("[T]he principles above stated [relating to property] ought to serve as a rule in
all proceedings whenever there is a question concerning the legality of captures"). See also Ford
and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 231-32 (Mar 22, 1776) (cited in note 157)
(discussing "lawful prize[s]"); id at 248 (Apr 2, 1776) (noting that courts may proceed "to condemn
the said captures, if they be adjudged lawful prize"); Ford and Hunt, eds, 9 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 804 (Oct 17, 1777) (cited in note 200) (discussing the measures for "making lawful
prize British vessels [ I brought into ... the United States").
221 Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journals of the ContinentalCongress at 1153 (Dec 4, 1781) (cited
in note 176).
220
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This interpretation of the Articles of Confederation does create
one potential difficulty, however: under what authority did the Conti-

nental Congress control the taking and treatment of prisoners? With
respect to prisoners detained by public forces, the power might come
from that of making "rules for the government and regulation of the
said land and naval forces, and directing their operations.' . Many of

the resolutions dealt with the treatment of prisoners on board vessels
taken as potential prizes; this power might be incidental to the captures power or the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal.m
Other resolutions and correspondence dealt with the terms of agree-

ments with England to release, exchange, or furlough prisoners; this
power may have come within Congress's power of "entering into treaties and alliances."""

E.

Conclusion
Records of the Continental Congress probably provide the best

available information about the meaning of captures in the Constitution. The Continental Congress dealt extensively with captures, and
made a number of "resolutions" and "ordinances" regulating them;

this language is similar to that used in the Constitution. Many of the
delegates to the Continental Congress involved in formulating these
regulations went on to play important roles in the framing of the Constitution, including James Madison,m Edmund Randolph, 6 and Oliver
222 Articles of Confederation Art IX (emphasis added). This clause of the Articles of Confederation was incorporated into the Constitution without the italicized language.
223 See, for example, Ford and Hunt, eds, 4 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 254 (Apr
3,1776) (cited in note 157). Under British practice it was the Crown that issued such instructions.
See, for example, Additional instructions as to prisoners taken in prizes, 1744, in Marsden, ed, 2
Law and Custom 430, 430 (cited in note 50). As instructions to privateers, enforced through the
bond required of such vessels, they may well have been understood as a function of the power
over Letters of Marque and Reprisal.
224 Articles of Confederation Art IX.
225 Ford and Hunt, eds, 19 Journalsof the ContinentalCongress at 270 (Mar 15,1781) (cited
in note 170); id at 314 (Mar 27, 1781); id at 374 (Apr 12, 1781); Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof
the ContinentalCongress at 967-68 n 1 (Sept 17,1781) (cited in note 176).
226 Randolph played an important role in drafting the Continental Congress's prize regulations and was one of the Members of Congress who heard prize appeals during the Revolution.
Ford and Hunt, eds, 20 Journals of the Continental Congress at 764 (July 18, 1781) (cited in
note 196); Ford and Hunt, eds, 21 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 861-68 (Aug 14, 1781)
(cited in note 176); id at 1147 (Nov 30, 1781). He also served as attorney general for both Virginia and the United States, as governor of Virginia, as a judge on a state admiralty court, as the
head of the Virginia delegation, and as a member of the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention. William R. Casto, The Origins of FederalAdmiralty Jurisdictionin an Age of
Privateers,Smugglers, and Pirates,37 Am J Legal Hist 117,118-19 (1993).
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Ellsworth." Congressional control over captures extended to authorizations for both public and private maritime vessels to seize certain
property; with these authorizations, Congress made important decisions about strategy and compliance with international law. This power over captures was significant not just for initiating conflict, but also
in how it was waged. Consistent with British practice, Congress also
had the narrower power to determine ownership interests in lawful
captures. Congressional power over captures likely did not extend to
people, however. Finally, the only significant dispute about the power
over captures involved the federal power to review state court prize
decisions, particularly those rendered by a jury.
The point of the Constitution was to ramp up the Articles of Confederation, so the distribution of power under the Articles is obviously
not in and of itself determinative of the Constitution's division of authority. What is important, however, is the meaning of the language
used in the Constitution and, in the case of captures, the experience
under and the language of the Articles of Confederation sheds important light on the meaning of the Constitution's text.
V. THE CONSTITUTION

A.

The Federal Convention

Not surprisingly given the experience of the Revolutionary War
and the concerns that arose during the critical period, the preliminary
plans for a Constitution focused on "captures" in terms of the federal
courts. The Hamilton and Virginia plans would have given federal
courts the complete power to hear cases involving captures: Hamilton
as a matter of original jurisdiction in a supreme court, and the Virginia
plan by vesting lower federal courts, as well as a supreme court, with
the power to decide such cases.m The New Jersey Plan, as recorded in
227 On Ellsworth's drafting of the first Judiciary Act, see Casto, 37 Am J Legal Hist at 13940 (cited in note 226). Of the fifty-five delegates at the Constitutional Convention, twenty-four
had served in the Continental Congress. Martin Diamond, The Founding of the Democratic
Republic 17 (RE. Peacock 1981).
228 Virginia Plan, Version A: "Resd that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one
or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature ...
the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of
the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the
high seas, captures from an enemy." Virginia, Version A, The Avalon Project (May 29, 1787),
online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/vatexta.asp (visited Nov 6, 2009). Hamilton's
Plan, Version A: "VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in ... This Court to have
original jurisdiction in all causes of capture." Hamilton's Plan, Version A, The Avalon Project
(1787), online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/hamtexta.asp (visited Nov 6,2009).
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James Madison's notes, created only a supreme court and gave it only
appellate review power over cases of captures.n The Pinckney Plan, by
contrast, allowed Congress to create in each state a court of admiralty
and to appoint "the Judges etc of the same for all maritime Causes
which may arise therein respectively.' 'sa In the end, of course, the Con-

stitution gave Congress the power to create lower federal courts and
also provided that the "judicial power" of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."' As to direct congressional power over captures, by contrast, the plans said
little. The Virginia plan proposed that the "National Legislature" under the Constitution "enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress
by the Confederation," which included the language on captures in the
Articles of Confederation.. 2 The Patterson Plan was similar, 2 3 and
Hamilton's vested the "supreme legislative power" in Congress."
Pinckney's plan may have given Congress power to "make Rules concerning Captures from an Enemy."' 5
Captures were occasionally mentioned in the opening days of the
Constitutional Convention to emphasize the "national" character of
the government under the Articles of Confederation, in response to
the claims that the proposed Constitution gave the government too
much authority and lay beyond the power of the Convention to

229 Max Farrand, ed, 1 The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787 244 (June 15, 1787)
(Yale 1911). Farrand's version of the New Jersey Plan does not include this language. See Max
Farrand, ed, 3 The Records of the FederalConvention of 1787 611-16 (Yale 1911).
230 The Plan of Charles Pinckney (South Carolina),Presented to the Federal Convention, May 29,
1787, in Sketch of Pinckney's Planfor a Constitution, 1787,9 Am Hist Rev 735, 741-47 (1904).
231 US Const Art III, § 2. On June 12, 1787, the Convention apparently agreed to remove
the language "all captures from an enemy" from the Virginia Plan; this language concerned the
power of the judiciary. Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the FederalConvention at 211 (June 12, 1787)
(cited in note 229). The Supreme Court has held that admiralty jurisdiction includes prize cases.
See Glass v The Sloop Betsey, 3 US (3 Dall) 6,7-12 (1794).
232

Id at 21.

"Resd that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in Congress, by the present
existing articles of Confederation." Variant Texts of the Plan Presented by William Patterson Text A, The Avalon Project (1787), online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/patexta.asp
(visited Nov 6,2009).
2m VariantTexts of the Plan Presentedby Alexander Hamilton to the FederalConvention - Text A,
The Avalon Project (1787), online at http'/avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/hamtexta.asp (visited Nov
6,2009) (outlining Hamilton's proposal for the functions and procedures of the legislature).
235 Farrand, ed, 3 The Records of the Federal Convention at 598 (cited in note 229). Max
Farrand documents uncertainty about the content of the Pinckney Plan, id at 595, and the American Historical Review provides a version without this language. 9 Am Hist Rev at 741-47 (cited
in note 230). The Pinckney Plan played little recorded role at the Constitutional Convention,
although it was referred to the Committee of Detail. Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the Federal Convention at 595 (cited in note 229).
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enact. ' Specific language about the Captures Clause was addressed
first by the Committee of Detail at the end of July, which wrote:
5. To make war<: (and)> raise armies. <& equip Fleets.>
6. To provide tribunals and punishment for mere offences against
the law of nations.
<Indian Affairs>
7. To declare the law of piracy, felonies and captures on the high
seas, and captures on land.
<to regulate Weights & Measures>
"7
8. To appoint tribunals, inferior to the supreme judiciary.
The version from the Committee of Detail reported out to the
Convention on August 6, 1787 consolidated the captures language and
moved it out of the clause on piracy and felonies:
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences against the law
of nations;
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its
legislature;
To make war;
To raise armies;
To build and equip fleets. '
'19
On August 17, "declare War" was substituted for "make War,"
and on the following day "and grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal"

236 Farrand, ed, 1 Records of the Federal Convention at 314 (June 19, 1787) (cited in note
229) (remarks of James Madison); id at 323-24 (remarks of Mr. King); id at 447 (remarks of Mr.
Madison). Franklin also used the word "captures" in passing on August 7, in a discussion of the
qualifications of electors. Max Farrand, ed, 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 210
(Aug 7, 1787) (Yale 1911) ("An English ship was taken by one of our men of war. It was proposed to the English sailors to join ours in a cruise and share alike with thm in the captures.").
237 Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 143-44 (cited in note 236) (showing
markup in original).
238 Id at 182 (Aug 6,1787).
239

Id at 319.
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was added after "declare war." This basic arrangement persisted
through September 10,' but then the Committee of Style moved the
captures language into its final position, immediately following the
Marque and Reprisal Clause.
What does this tour through the future Article I, § 8 mean? In its
initial wording ("declare the law of ... captures") and placement (with
piracy and felonies) the language seems directed to the courts, meaning that it would not have included authorization or people. But the
language and placement were quickly changed, in the August 6 report,
to "rules concerning" and moved into its own clause. Both point toward a broader type of control: the move takes it out of a clause arguably related to what courts do, and "rules" comes from the Articles of
Confederation, which did include authorization. Even on August 6,
however, the captures language stayed several lines removed from the
powers most directly related to war.
The Convention as a whole made the "declare War" change and
added Letters of Marque and Reprisal. It was the Committee of
Style-which was not authorized to make substantive changes 122 - that
moved the captures language to its final position with these other
powers. From the perspective of the Captures Clause-which, before
the Committee of Style got to it, was best read to include authorization -the best understanding of this move is that the Declare War and
Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clauses also included power related
to war initiation, and the three powers were united in the final version
for this reason.
B.

Change from the Articles of Confederation?

The foregoing analysis suggests that, in the end, the captures language in the Constitution has the same meaning that it had in the Articles of Confederation. Other considerations support this analysis as
well. ' As a purely textual matter, the Articles of Confederation used
240 Farrand, ed, 2 Records of the Federal Convention at 570 (Sept 10, 1787) (cited in
note 236) ("To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court; To make rules concerning
captures on land and water; To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, to punish the counterfeiting of the securities, and current coin of the United States, and
offences against the law of nations; To declare war; and grant letters of marque and reprisal").
241 Id at 595 (granting Congress the power "[t]o declare war, grant letters of marque and
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water").
242 See Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486,537-39 (1969).
243 See generally Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity from the Articles of Confederation into the Constitution, 20 Const Comment 463 (2004) (emphasizing the continuity between legislative powers in the Articles of Confederation and those in the Constitution).
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"of establishing rules for deciding in all cases, what captures on land
or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or
naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated."2 " The Constitution's language is: "make Rules concerning

Captures on land and water."' ' ' One could argue that the Constitution's phrasing seems to eliminate the second part of the power under
the Articles of Confederation, regarding the apportionment of prizes,

but this is extremely implausible. As we have seen, the English Parliament had controlled-with little controversy-this aspect of prizes

for almost a century.2. Moreover, "ordinances" and "regulations"
passed by the Continental Congress determined the division of prizes,
and the term "rules concerning" is best understood to be broader than
"rules for deciding ... what ... captures shall be legal" so as to encompass the second part as well.

The debates from the state ratification conventions are of little
help. Records from Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New

Hampshire, New York, and North Carolina do not mention captures at
all.2" The South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia Conventions
mentioned captures in the context of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts and the right to a jury trial.28 There is no record of any discussion of the captures language from Article I. In the Federalist Papers,
Madison referred to captures as he had during the Federal Convention, to illustrate the scope of the federal government's power under
the Articles of Confederation!29

244 Articles of Confederation Art IX.

US Const Art I, § 8.
See notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
247 See generally Jonathan Elliot, ed, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the FederalConstitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 (J.B. Lippincott 1891).
248 Convention of Virginia,in Jonathan Elliot, ed, 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the FederalConstitution as Recommended by the General Convention at
Philadelphiain 1787 468-69 (J.B. Lippincott 1891); id at 535-36 (June 20,1788); Convention of
South Carolina,in Jonathan Elliot, ed, 4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 307-08 (J.B. Lippincott 1891). See also James Wilson: Address to a Meeting of the
Citizens of Philadelphiaon October 6, 1787, in Farrand, ed, 3 Records of the FederalConvention
at 101 (cited in note 229):
245

246

Besides, it is not in all cases that the trial by jury is adopted in civil questions: for causes depending in courts of admiralty, such as relate to maritime captures, and such as are agitated
in the courts of equity, do not require the intervention of that tribunal. How, then, was the
line of discrimination to be drawn? The convention found the task too difficult for them;
and they left the business as it stands ....
249 Federalist 40 (Madison), in The Federalist258,262 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed).
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An English language dictionary published in 1789 in Philadelphia
provides the following definitions 50
TO Captivate, kvpti'oute..

a. to take pyriner

to cdam, to fubduc.

Captivation, koOapIhw' f. the aa of taking
one captive.

Captive, kayatiu'. r one taken in war; one Charmed by beauty.
Captive, k pls.'. .4.nride prifoner in war.
captivity, kih*¢Z','. L fmbjetozan by the late
f war.
Captor, kVf'sr'. f. hiewho tukes a prifraer, or a
prim.

Captume, A 't fiw. f. the ad or pra..icc of taking
any thing; a prize.

Consistent with common practice during the Revolution, "Capture" as
used here does not refer to people, but instead to the act of taking
"any thing" or to the thing (prize) itself. Although this definition is not
limited to property taken in the context of maritime conflicts, it is best
understood as applying only to moveable ("any thing") property.2 ' In
the end, captures are probably best understood to include moveable
property taken by land or naval forces, so long as judicial determination of ownership is sought, making them analogous to "prize."
C.

The First Years of the Republic

In the first decade after ratification of the Constitution, the word
"captures" was used much as it had been during the Revolutionary

War, generally to mean the taking of moveable property by a mari52 This subject was an
time vessel for subsequent adjudication as prize.Y
250 Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the English Language (1789), in Early
American Imprints, No 45588 (cited in note 30).
251 The dictionary defines "prize" as something taken by adventure or plunder.
252 7 Annals of Cong 65 (May 19, 1797) (describing a letter from Major General Mountflorence to General Pinckney, dated Paris, February 14, which mentioned "the capture of a vessel
from Boston, and another from Baltimore, by an American citizen on board a privateer"); id
(describing another letter from Pinckney "mentioning the capture of several American vessels");
id at 66 (describing a letter from the Secretary of State to the Minister of Spain regarding the Jay
Treaty, which "afforded satisfaction to our mercantile citizens for the capture of our ships and
cargoes"); id at 92 (May 23, 1797) ("... the French were guilty of the first aggression as to captures at sea."). Article VII of the Jay Treaty states: "divers merchants and others, citizens of the
United States" who complained of "irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and other property, under colour of authority or commissions from his Majesty." Treaty of

1734

The University of Chicago Law Review

[76:1683

important one, particularly as the second Washington administration
sought to stay neutral as between France and England in 1793,1' and
the Adams administration struggled to respond to French attacks on
American shipping during the quasi-war beginning in 1798." ' Thus, it is
not surprising that the term "capture" was used in this context-these
were the issues of the times. More surprising, perhaps, is that when the
respective constitutional powers of the president and Congress were
discussed, little was said about the captures power itself.
Most significant for the foregoing discussion is legislation passed
in early 1799 that dealt with the treatment of prisoners. President John
Adams was considered politically weak, and he knew that the prospect of war with France was very unpopular in some quarters. Whether for political or constitutional reasons, Adams sought approval from
Congress for most aspects of the response to French aggressionarming merchant vessels, authorizing seizures of French property by
public vessels, and retaliating against French prisoners.255 Legislation
from February entitled, "An Act concerning French Citizens that have
been, or may be captured and brought into the United States" gave the
president the power to "exchange or send away" French prisoners
aboard captured vessels. In March, Congress vested the president with
the "power of retaliation" and required him (under certain circumstances) to "cause the most rigorous retaliation to be executed on any
such citizens of the French Republic, as have been or hereafter may be
captured in pursuance of any of the laws of the United States." 5'
These pieces of legislation, both of which use the verb "capture"
with respect to people, may suggest that Congress can control the taking and disposition of prisoners under the Captures Clause." The participants in the House debates never explicitly made this argument,

Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of
America, 8 Stat 116 (1794).
253 See William R. Casto, ForeignAffairs and the Constitutionin the Age of Fighting Sail 22-23
(South Carolina 2006).
254 Sofaer, War,Foreign Affairs, and ConstitutionalPower at 144-45 (cited in note 26).
255

Id at 132,137-66.

An Act Concerning French Citizens that have been, or may be captured and brought
into the United States, 1 Stat 624 (1799).
257 An Act vesting the power of retaliation, in certain cases, in the President of the United
States, 1 Stat 743 (1799).
258 Other similar legislation did not use the word "capture" with respect to people. See An
Act to authorize the defence of the Merchant Vessels of the United States against French depredations, 1 Stat 572, 573 (1798); An Act in addition to the act more effectually to protect the
Commerce and Coasts of the United States, 1 Stat 574, 575 (1798); An Act further to protect the
Commerce of the United States, 1 Stat 578,580 (1798).
256
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however. During the debate on the Act of March 3,"' Harrison G. Otis
argued that it came within Congress's power because the retaliation
was, in effect, a reprisal. 6 Other language in the debates may suggest
that legislation related to prisoners was viewed in terms of the declare
France. 16
war power, because it risked provoking a full-scale war with
To the extent that such legislation might have been understood as a
function of the captures power, it still points to a narrow power over
prisoners that extends only to those on board vessels taken as prize.
VI. CAPTURES AND OTHER WAR-RELATED POWERS

The previous Part concluded that the Captures Clause gave Congress the power to determine what moveable property could be taken
by public and private armed forces as prize, and the power to control
the adjudication and division of such property. Contrary to some
commentators 2 and to what the Court has suggested, it did not give
Congress power over the taking and treatment of people, except perhaps as an incident to the capture of a vessel. Contrary to other commentators, the Clause was limited neither to private vessels ' nor to
procedural rules, 5 but instead also gave Congress control over the
conduct of public vessels with respect to moveable property. With this
understanding of captures in place, we can consider its relationship to
the other closely related constitutional powers.
Letters of Marque and Reprisal and the Offenses Clause

A.

Commentators have struggled to understand the Marque and
Reprisal Clause; perhaps it controls all forms of low-intensity warfare
and war initiation,6 or both public and private seizures of property
(but not other kinds of low-intensity warfare), 67 or perhaps it conferred only the power to license private vessels to make lawful cap-

260

9 Annals of Cong 3045-51 (Mar 2,1799).
Id at 3051.

261

Id.

259

See notes 7-9.
See note 10.
264 See Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 319 (cited in note 3); Sidak, 28 Harv J L & Pub Policy at
468 (cited in note 11).
265 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peaceat 147 (cited in note 3); Sidak, 28 Harv J L & Pub Policy at
468 (cited in note 11).
266 Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 699-700 (cited in note 17); Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 67-70
(cited in note 18).
267 Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1613-19 (2002) (cited in note 5); Wuerth, 106 Mich L Rev at
90 (cited in note 9).
262
263
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tures.26 The foregoing discussion strongly supports the third view, be-

cause contrary to the assumption of virtually all scholars working in
9 it was the Captures Clause-not the Marque and Reprisal
this area,M
Clause-that gave Congress the power to determine what property
was subject to capture. This resolves a key uncertainty about the Marque and Reprisal Clause: it seems only to apply to the licensing of private vessels, yet Congress was clearly understood to control what
property could be taken by public vessels as well."'
This tension is resolved by the Captures Clause, which applied to

both public and private forces. Congress did control the taking of
property by public vessels (including takings of property characterized
as reprisals), but it did so under the Captures Clause. Letters of Marque and Reprisal referred, as the word "letters" suggests, to the licens-

ing of private vessels, not to the determination about what kinds of
property those vessels could take.' This interpretation is supported by

the Articles of Confederation, which gave states the power to grant
letters of marque and reprisal during war. ' This language gave states
the power to license private vessels, but it did not confer upon states
any power to determine what enemy or neutral property was subject
to taking. That power belonged to Congress during the Revolutionary

War, as part of its authority over captures.
Kent, 85 Tex L Rev at 920 (cited in note 19).
Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1617-18 (cited in note 5); Reveley, III, War Powers of the
President and Congress at 63-64 (cited in note 28); Lobel, 50 U Miami L Rev at 67 (cited in
note 18); Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 696-97 (cited in note 17). Some scholars have argued that the
Marque and Reprisal Clause covers just the licensing of private vessels, without understanding
that the Captures Clause confers the substantive power to determine what moveable property
may be seized by private and public vessels. See Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace at 147 (cited
in note 3); Sidak, 28 Harv J L & Pub Policy at 468 (cited in note 11); C. Kevin Marshall, Comment, Putting Privateers in Their Place: The Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to
UndeclaredWars, 64 U Chi L Rev 953,953-54 (1997).
270 Consider Lofgren, 81 Yale L J at 695-96 (cited in note 17) (conceding that the technical
definition of letters of marque and reprisal meant only the power to give letters to private individuals, but rejecting this interpretation as inconsistent with the overall allocation of powers to
Congress and the president); Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1618 (cited in note 5).
271 This is precisely how James Madison described letters of marque and reprisal in Federalist
No 44, where he wrote that under the Constitution "these licenses must be obtained as well
during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of the United States. This alteration [from the Articles of Confederation] is fully justified by the advantage of uniformity in all
points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those,
for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible." Federalist 44 (Madison), in The Federalist
299, 299 (cited in note 249). See also Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation Between The
United States of America, and the King of Spain, Art XIV, 8 Stat 138 (1795); Ford and Hunt, eds,
5 Journalsof the Continental Congress at 774 (Sept 17, 1776) (cited in note 170) (proposing similar language for a treaty with France).
272 Articles of Confederation Art XIII.
268
269
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Moreover, references to reprisals-not to letters of marque and
reprisal-were the common way to describe the substantive power to
take goods.V This usage is best explained by the argument advanced
here: Congress controlled the substantive power over reprisals (that is,

to determine what property gets taken) and other kinds of captures
(including property taken in war), but that power is conferred by the
Captures Clause or some other clause in Article I, not by the power to
issue letters to particular private individuals. A reprisal power that
extended to taking people-already uncommon by the late eighteenth

century-might have been given to Congress by virtue of its power to
"define and punish ...Offenses against the Law of Nations." And, of

course, Congress may have had the power to determine the treatment
of prisoners taken aboard prize vessels as a function of its captures
power. Reprisals were granted as a response to wrongdoing by other

countries, and were thus one means of punishing an offense against

the law of nations.2 4 Indeed, this is likely why James Madison thought
the Captures Clause was redundant to the Offenses Clause -the latter
gave Congress a general power to act against countries that violated

the law of nations, the former was a more specific power that could be
used for the same purpose."
To be sure, some eighteenth-century authors did suggest that the
peacetime granting of letters of marque and reprisal was associated

with war initiation, which undermines the claim that the significant,
substantive power over reprisals and other taking of property was
actually found in the Captures Clause. Blackstone, for example, wrote

that "the prerogative of granting" letters of marque or reprisal "is
nearly related to, and plainly derived from, that other of making war;
this being indeed only an incomplete state of hostilities, and generally

273 Burlamaqui, Principles of Politic Law at pt 4, ch 3, §§ 30-32 (cited in note 76) (discussing
substantive power in terms of reprisals, not letters); Vattel, The Law of Nations at 284-89 (cited
in note 70) (same); Hale, 1 History of the Pleas at 161 (cited in note 97) (same); Ford and Hunt,
eds, 4 Journals of the Continental Congress at 230 (cited in note 157) ("It being therefore necessary to provide for their defence and security, and justifiable to make reprisals upon their enemies, and otherwise to annoy them."); Opinion of Mr. Jefferson, Sec. of State, May 16, 1793, in 7
Jefferson's Works 628, reprinted in John Bassett Moore, ed, 7 A Digest of International Law 123
(GPO 1906) (making the same argument); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry
(May 17, 1798), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 21 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 461, 461-62 (Columbia 1974) ("[T]his must fall under the idea of reprisals and requires the sanction of that
Department which is to declare or make war.").
274 Kent, 85 Tex L Rev at 915 (cited in note 19).
275 See note 21 and accompanying text.
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ending in a formal declaration of war... 6 This language does suggest
that power over "letters" of marque and reprisal includes the power to
determine what property was taken. But Blackstone's use of the term
was obviously not coextensive with the constitutional meaning of letters of marque and reprisal. He goes on to say that
[t]hese letters are grantable by the law of nations, whenever the
subjects of one state are oppressed and injured by those of
another, and justice is denied by that state to which the oppressor
belongs. In this case letters of marque and reprisal ... may be obtained, in order to seise the bodies or goods of the subjects of the
offending state, until satisfaction be made.2"
This language describes specific, peacetime reprisals in which individuals seek compensation for harm done to them personally. The Constitution unequivocally includes both war and peacetime letters of marque and reprisal. "
The definition provided by Blackstone also does not account for
the changes in the use of the word "capture" during the Revolutionary
War. And, equally significant, the specific, private reprisals to which
Blackstone is referring in this passage were already obsolete in practice when Blackstone wrote." ' Under the old practice -when reprisals
allowed an aggrieved private individual to seek redress from the subjects of another country-the letter itself provided the power to seize
the goods. With general reprisals or the seizure of enemy property
during war-where private parties took property based not on harm
to them specifically, but instead based on harm to the nation as a
whole tm-it was not the letter that provided that power, but a general
order (British practice) or an act of Congress (American practice during the Revolutionary War and thereafter) that did so. The letter
merely licensed a particular private individual to take goods, the sei276 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *250 (cited in note 140); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick (Jan 20, 1797), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 20 The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton 473,473-75 (Columbia 1973).
277 Blackstone, 1 Commentaries at *250-51 (cited in note 140). See also Letter from James
McHenry to John Adams (May 18, 1798), in Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional
Power at 155 (cited in note 26) (referring to whether an act comes within "the sphere of reprisals
and ...require[s] the explicit sanction of the branch of the government, which is alone constitutionally authorised to grant letters of marque and reprisal").
278 The Articles of Confederation distinguished between war and peacetime letters of marque and reprisal. The Constitution does not. See Federalist 44 (Madison) at 299 (cited in note
271) (explaining the reason for the change).
279 See text at notes 94-102.
280 See note 97.
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zure of which had already been generally authorized. As early as 1664,
for example, the king ordered general reprisals against the States

General (the Dutch) by both public and private vessels. A separate
commission to the Lord High Admiral allowed him to license private
subjects to seize Dutch property. Similarly, a letter of marque from
1760 authorized Birchman Pillans to seize the property of "enemies."

It was the declaration of war that enabled the seizure of property; the
letter of marque merely identified an individual that was licensed to
do so." As described above, captures of property during the Revolu-

tionary War were controlled by acts of Congress that directed what
could be taken; letters only authorized specific people to do so. Indeed, the specific letters of marque and reprisal described by Blackstone were rarely issued even by the British during the eighteenth
century and were never issued at all by the United States.'
Careful understanding of the Captures Clause has thus resolved
longstanding and fundamental confusion about the Marque and Reprisal Clause. We turn now to the significance of both in relation to
the language that immediately precedes them: "Declare War."
B.

Declare War

The Captures Clause is cited on all sides of the Declare War debate. Some argue that the Declare War Clause includes only the power to make a legal declaration about the state of hostilities;2 others
281 Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom at 48-49 (cited in note 50). See also Grover Clark, The
English Practicewith Regard to Reprisals by Private Persons, 27 Am J Intl L 694, 720-22 (1933)
(describing this authorization for general reprisals); Hale, 1 History of the Pleas at 161 (cited in
note 97) (distinguishing general reprisals from the commissions that private parties needed
before taking the ships or goods of the adverse party).
282 Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom at 50 (cited in note 50) (authorizing the Lord High
Admiral to grant such commissions "to anie such of our loving subjects and others as you shall
deeme [I qualified").
283 Letter of marque, 1760, in Marsden, ed, 2 Law and Custom 390, 390-93 (cited in note 50)
(granting a commission to a particular captain to capture a particular ship). As another example, in
1739 the Privy Council authorized the issuance of letters of marque with the following language:

Owing to the many and repeated depredations of Spanish guarda costas in the West Indies
and elsewhere, and to the non-payment by Spain of the sum agreed on as reparation by the
convention of 14 January last, his Majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, orders general reprisals against Spanish ships, and the issue of letters of marque.
Swanson, Predatorsand Prizes at 30 (cited in note 29). This order of the Privy Council does not
actually grant any letters of marque or reprisal, it merely orders that such letters be granted.
Colonial governors, for example, were empowered by the secretary of state in charge of the
colonies to actually grant the letters authorized by the Privy Council. Id.
2M Hindmarsh, Force in Peace at 53-54 n 1 (cited in note 95).
285 Yoo, The Powers of War and Peace at 143-55 (cited in note 3).
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maintain that it gives Congress the complete power to bring the country into a state of war, including the power to commit troops both offensively and defensively; others take an intermediate view that the
Declare War Clause gives Congress the power to commit troops or
otherwise initiate war offensively, but that once the United States is
attacked the president has the power to bring the United States into a
state of war.m For those with a narrow view of the Declare War
Clause, the task has been to minimize the Captures and Marque and
Reprisal Clauses; these scholars have argued that the Captures Clause
confers on Congress only control over the procedural aspects of captures and reaches only takings by private, not public vessels. As described above, however, the Captures Clause confers on Congress the
broad power to determine the property subject to capture both during
and before a full-scale war, allowing Congress to initiate or escalate
hostilities.m This cuts against a narrow reading of the Declare War
Clause, for the Captures Clause gives Congress control over one method of initiating war.28'
For those with a broad view of the Declare War Clause, the task
has been to explain whether (and if so, why) the Captures Clause is
290
redundant of the Declare War Clause. Over the dissent of Justice
Story, the Court in Brown reasoned in effect that that the Captures
Clause was not entirely redundant of the Declare War Clause. The
Court held that the declaration of war in 1812 did not itself provide
authorization for the taking of enemy property on land at the outset
of hostilities.2' The Court is best understood as reasoning that the
Captures Clause requires very clear congressional authorization for
the taking of enemy property, and that absent the Captures Clause
executive branch officials might have had greater power pursuant to
the Declare War Clause. But there is another way in which the
Clauses are not redundant: even an expansive view of the declare war
power to include all forms of war initiation would not include the

286

Prakash, 93 Cornell L Rev at 46-48 (cited in note 3).

287 See Michael D. Ramsey, The President'sPower to Respond to Attacks, 93 Cornell L Rev

169,170 (2007).
288

See Parts IV and V.

289

Ramsey, 69 U Chi L Rev at 1602 (cited in note 5) (making this argument based on the

Marque and Reprisals Clause).
290 See Delahunty and Yoo, 93 Cornell L Rev at 127 (cited in note 3); Prakash, 93 Cornell L
Rev at 55 nn 38,40 (cited in note 3).
291 Brown, 12 US (8 Cranch) at 129.
292 Justice Story viewed the Captures Clause as merely explanatory of the Declare War Clause,
included in the Constitution out of an abundance of caution. See id at 151 (Story dissenting).
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power to determine how captured property would be adjudicated and
divided; this power belonged to Parliament (for the most part) under
the British system, to the Continental Congress (with respect to its
vessels) during the Revolutionary War, and now to Congress under
the Constitution. Moreover, Brown suggests the Captures Clause gave
Congress more power to control the prosecution of an ongoing war
than it would have enjoyed under the Declare War Clause alone. It is
also very clear, however, that the Captures Clause and the Declare
War Clause do overlap in significant ways. The power to declare war
may well have included the power to grant general reprisals (which is
also a function of the Captures Clause), and, as we have seen, declarations of war occasionally directed that specific kinds of property were
subject to capture; Congress's war powers under Article I were partially overlapping, and arguments that seek to avoid such overlap
should be treated with suspicion.
A careful analysis of the Captures Clause thus makes significant
contributions to the enduring debate about the Declare War Clause. It
has cleared up a fundamental and longstanding error as to the scope
of the Letters of Marque and Reprisal Clause: it does indeed pertain
only to the licensing of private vessels, but the Captures Clause gave
Congress power over the taking of property by public and private
forces. This reorientation arguably supports a broad reading of the
Declare War Clause in three ways. First, it makes clear that Congress
controlled a potential method of war initiation, strengthening the case
that the Declare War Clause included more than the power to issue a
legal declaration. Second, it answers the argument that the Clauses are
thereby redundant, for the captures power also had a procedural side
and significance in war prosecution, which would not necessarily have
been part of the declare war power. Finally, for the same reason, this
understanding of the Captures Clause undermines the argument that
the Declare War Clause should not be read to include all measures
short of war on the grounds that this reading would make it redundant
with the Captures and Marque and Reprisal Clauses.
C.

Rules for the Government and Regulation of the Armed Forces

One starting point for understanding this grant of power to Congress is the Articles of War that the Continental Congress enacted
during the Revolutionary War,"' although the language of the Consti293 See American Articles of War of 1775, in William Winthrop, 2 Military Law 953, 953-60
(W.H. Morrison 1886); American Articles of War of 1776, in Winthrop, 2 Military Law 961,961-
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tution is more limited than that of the Articles of Confederation. 26 The
Articles of War functioned as codes of conduct for those in the military, outlining rules against swearing, cowardice, and insubordination
(among other things), providing for punishment, and authorizing trials
by court-martial." They did not mention the taking or treatment of
enemy prisoners. Moreover, the Articles of War set out general standards of conduct and behavior for those serving in the military, but did
not provide specific tactical directions for activities like the treatment
or exchanges of particular prisoners.
One commentator has nevertheless suggested that the government-and-regulation power includes a comprehensive power over
enemy prisoners, and over the direction of military operations generally.' Not much direct evidence supports this claim, however. With
respect to prisoners this argument is supported with citations to US
legislation from the 1790s (described in part above) and to British
legislation from 1749 (and earlier) generally governing the treatment
of people aboard vessels taken as prizes, but apparently nothing
links these specifically to the government-and-regulation power in the
Constitution. Justice Story discusses the power only with respect to
the appropriate punishment for those serving in the "fleets and ar-

ies," which is the way that the Supreme Court has understood the
government-and-regulation power.299

And there are several alternative theories for the source of the
power that Congress exercised over prisoners during the 1790s. Perhaps
this authority came from the Offenses Clause, as suggested above,3°° or
71. See also Parker v Levy, 417 US 733, 745-46 (1974) (relying generally on the Articles of War
to interpret the Government and Regulation Clause).
294 See Michael D. Ramsey, Response: DirectingMilitary Operations,87 Tex L Rev See Also
29 (2009), online at http://www.texaslrev.com/seealso/vol/87/responses/ramsey (visited Nov 6,
2009). See also note 222 and accompanying text.
295 American Articles of War of 1775, in Winthrop, 2 Military Law 953, 953-60 (cited in note
293); American Articles of War of 1776, in Winthrop, 2 Military Law 961, 961-71 (cited in note 293)
(providing a general code of conduct; for instance, recommending attendance at religious services).
296 Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 338-39 (cited in note 3). Consider Wuerth, 106 Mich L Rev at
95 (cited in note 9) (attributing in passing Congress's power over prisoners to either the Captures Clause or the Government and Regulation Clause).
297

Id.

Story, 3 Commentaries at § 1197 (cited in note 20) (noting that the power to regulate "is
more safe in the hands of Congress than of the executive; since, otherwise, the most summary
and severe punishments might be inflicted at the mere will of the executive").
299 See, for example, Loving v United States, 517 US 748, 753 (1996); Ryder v United States,
515 US 177, 186 (1995); Solorio v United States, 483 US 435, 438 (1987); Chappell v Wallace, 462
US 296,305 (1983); Toth v Quarles,350 US 11,15 (1955).
298
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See Part VI.A.

The Captures Clause

2009]

1743

as a function of the Declare War Clause, or (with respect to prisoners
taken aboard prize vessels) as incidental to the Captures or Marque and
Reprisal Clauses. Or perhaps these Acts of Congress from the late
1790s-a full decade after the Constitution was ratified-were already
a departure from the original understanding of the Constitution, facilitated by the political weakness of President Adams.3"
D.

The Commander-in-Chief Power

Congressional authority over captures also suggests that in one
sense the commander-in-chief power is more limited than many descriptions suggest, for with this power Congress controls at least one
aspect of the way force is deployed and used, even during an ongoing
war. It gives Congress control over what property can be seized by
both public and private forces for the purposes of perfecting title
through a judicial proceeding. As a function of naval power, this was
tremendously important during the Revolutionary War-as well as in
the earlier eighteenth-century wars and in the foreign policy difficulties that would arise in the 1790s. On the other hand, the Captures
Clause did not give Congress a general power to control the taking
and detention of people.
E.

Congressional Supremacy, War, and Foreign Affairs

The foregoing analysis of the Captures Clause adds to a growing
body of scholarship that emphasizes congressional supremacy in war
and foreign affairs as a matter of history, practice, and doctrine. Some
scholars have argued, for example, that the president has no exclusive
powers as commander in chief and that Congress has the power to
fully and comprehensively regulate the initiation and prosecution of
war and other armed conflicts.'2 Others have emphasized the significance of the Offenses Clause and Congress's power to establish lower
federal courts -both allowed Congress to control the US response to
violations of international law and to limit the situations in which the
United States would be drawn into armed conflict."
The Captures Clause provides some support for these arguments,
because it vests in Congress the exclusive power to determine what
301

See note 255 and accompanying text.

302 See Lobel, 69 Ohio St L J at 393 (cited in note 3); Prakash, 87 Tex L Rev at 344 (cited in

note 3); Barron and Lederman, 121 Harv L Rev at 1106-11 (cited in note 3). See generally Luban, 81 S Cal L Rev 477 (cited in note 3) (suggesting a strong role for Congress).
303 Kent, 85 Tex L Rev at 854-55,927 (cited in note 19); Bellia and Clark, 109 Colum L Rev
at 32, 44-45 (cited in note 3). See also Wuerth, 106 Mich L Rev at 84 (cited in note 9).
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moveable property could be taken by public and private armed vessels, which was extremely important in the late eighteenth centuryboth tactically and legally. As rich and significant as the history of the
Captures Clause is, however, it also provides reasons to be skeptical of
attempts to read the Constitution's text in the area of war and foreign
affairs power to find overarching answers or ones that avoid overlap,
gaps, and uncertainties. Even with respect to the conclusions drawn in
this Article about the Clause itself, there is countervailing evidence.
Moreover, the Declare War and Captures Clauses give Congress overlapping authority, and the Offenses Clause may overlap with both.
And Congress's power to dictate the taking and treatment of prisoners seems to have been understood during the Revolutionary War and
the 1790s, yet the source of that power is unclear. Finally, it gives reason to be skeptical of constitutional analysis that trades heavily on
continuity with the British and colonial past: on the surface, the Captures Clause may look like it is drawn wholesale from the earlier practice, but careful analysis reveals innovation, discontinuity, and a clear
break from the past.
CONCLUSION

The original meaning of the Captures Clause does not emerge
from the historical record as clearly as one might hope. Use of the
word "captures" changed in several ways through the course of the
eighteenth century, but the word was a common, not technical, one,
and the changes yield a continuum of potential meanings instead of
sharp binary choices. Moreover, until the work of the Continental
Congress during the Revolutionary War, the word "captures" was not
used in direct conjunction with either phrases like "land and water" or
"rules concerning." Textually, the relationship between the language of
the Articles of Confederation and the ordinances and resolutions of
the Continental Congress is close and significant. The importance of
this relationship does not emerge from these documents alone, however, but instead from the lack of any similar language in the British
and American documents that preceded them. The colonists were
making it up as they went along, and documents related to captures
offer a striking example: traditional documents related to maritime
warfare were edited and reworded to fit the new organization of government, and the term "captures" was used in a new way. The text of
the Constitution is far closer to these distinctive, novel usages, than it
is to anything that came before.
The best understanding of the Clause is narrow in terms of object,
including moveable property taken for adjudication as prize, but not
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persons. The type of control is broad: it includes the power to authorize the making of captures and also to determine their legality. This
conclusion helps, in turn, to make sense of other uncertainties about
congressional and presidential power. It resolves a longstanding confusion about the Marque and Reprisal Clause, which provides only the
power to license private vessels. That conclusion has been resisted because Congress clearly exercised the power to determine what property could be taken by both private and public vessels. This power is a
function of the Captures Clause, however, not the Marque and Reprisal Clause. With this congressional power established, it becomes
clear that the declare war power includes at least some methods of
war initiation and some measures short of war. Finally, any claim that
the president, as a matter of constitutional text and history, controls all
tactical decisions about how force is deployed, is put to rest by a careful reading of the Captures Clause.
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